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Patent Accidents: Questioning Strict Liability in Patent Law
PATRICK R. GOOLD*
Accidental infringement of patent rights is a pervasive and growing problem in the
Information Age. As IP rights proliferate and expand in scope, it is becoming
increasingly easy for companies and individuals to inadvertently infringe patents.
When such accidental infringement occurs, patent law holds the infringer strictly
liable. This contrasts with many areas of tort law where defendants are only liable if
they act negligently.
This Article questions the normative desirability of strict liability in patent law.
Assuming the primary value of patent law is utilitarian, this Article poses the
research question: what liability rule will maximize social welfare? This Article
answers the question theoretically by applying economic models of accidents
developed in tort law literature. The research finds that a negligence rule is
preferable. Unlike strict liability, negligence liability will encourage both patentees
and technology users to take reasonable measures to prevent accidental
infringement, and thus minimize the social cost of patent accidents. Therefore, this
Article recommends reforms to the liability rule in direct patent infringement cases.
Defendants should be liable for accidental patent infringement only when they fail
to adopt reasonable care to avoid the infringement.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, a Canadian company, Research in Motion (RIM), launched the Blackberry
e-mail pager.1 The pager was an instant commercial success amongst businesspeople
and politicians alike. Behind the Blackberry’s success was its wireless e-mail
technology. No longer were e-mails confined to the desktop but were now easily
accessible on-the-go. The wireless email technology had been invented by RIM
founder Mike Lazaridis in the mid-1990s, or so Lazaridis thought. The following
year, RIM received a letter from a small Virginia-based company called NTP.2 The
letter alleged that the Blackberry infringed patents NTP held covering wireless
technology that an engineer, Thomas Campana, had invented in the mid-1980s. This
infringement letter came as a shock to RIM. Only a few months earlier RIM had
received its own U.S. patent on Blackberry’s e-mail technology.3 As far as RIM was
concerned, they had created the technology and had the patent to prove it! Yet NTP
won their infringement case in Virginia, securing an injunction that threatened to
bring the production of Blackberrys to a halt.4 To avoid a complete shutdown, RIM
ultimately paid NTP an exorbitant license fee of $612.5 million in 2006.5 But should
RIM have been held responsible for this patent infringement? Ought we hold
companies liable for infringing patents of which they were unaware and could not
reasonably have been expected to know about? In most areas of civil law, one is only
liable for such accidents if one has behaved negligently.6 Run a pedestrian over in
your car and you will only be accountable if you failed to take the care of a reasonable
person. But infringe a patent accidentally and you are liable even if you behaved
exactly as society would expect. Why is patent law the exception?

* Patrick R. Goold, Lecturer in Law, The City Law School. The author would like to
thank BJ Ard, Oren Bracha, Tun Jen Chiang, Yotam Kaplan, Oskar Liivak, and Henry Smith
for comments on the Article. The author would also like to thank Michael Meurer, Jim
Balsillie, Sean Silcoff, and Terry J. Zakreski QC, for helpful discussions on the topic. Special
gratitude is owed to Oskar Liivak who initially coined the term “Patent Accidents.” All errors
and omissions are the responsibility of the author. Copyright in the work is retained by the
author.
1. See JACQUIE MCNISH & SEAN SILCOFF, LOSING THE SIGNAL: THE UNTOLD STORY
BEHIND THE EXTRAORDINARY RISE AND SPECTACULAR FALL OF BLACKBERRY 67–78 (2018).
Later, in 2002–2003, the Blackberry would evolve into the more famous mobile cell phone.
Id. at 106–11.
2. Id. at 123.
3. Id. at 94.
4. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Va. 2003).
5. Rob Cox, Mike Verdin, Jonathan Ford & Edward Hadas, RIM’s Sensible Patent
Payout Keeps BlackBerry Users Hooked, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2006, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com /articles/SB114160357490989930 [perma.cc/2AD6-6URT].
6. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 842 (2d
ed. 2011); JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO
U.S. LAW: TORTS 265–66 (2010) (stating that strict liability exists at “the margins of tort,” and
is applicable in “a few special situations”).
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Accidental patent infringement is a pervasive, ignored, and growing problem. 7
Property rights in tangible property can only be infringed by a limited number of
individuals who are in close physical proximity to the tangible good. By contrast,
due to the nature of intangibles, patents can be infringed by multiple people
regardless of their location. Furthermore, unlike physical goods, with readily
ascertainable boundaries, the scope of patent boundaries is unpredictable. Ideally, a
nation’s patent register ought to give the public a clear picture of what is, and what
is not, subject to a patent. But patent law literature already provides evidence of a
number of barriers and obstacles which prevent registers performing this function as
well as we would hope.8 As a result, it is all too easy for even a diligent company to
become an accidental infringer, and the amount of such infringement is worrisome.
Scholars of patent law today describe the problem of inadvertent patent infringement
as “significant” and “getting worse.”9 Recent empirical evidence hints that perhaps
as much as eighty-nine percent of litigated patent infringements are unintentional and
inadvertent.10 Buy a wireless router to use in your small business, and you may
unknowingly use technology that was not licensed by the proprietor; incorporate
Bluetooth technology into a new cell phone after searching the patent register, and
you may be inadvertently manufacturing a technology whose patent information was
buried under a mountain of similar patents; grow crops on your farm and you may
later find such crops germinated from patented seeds which were blown by the wind
from nearby farm land.
This Article questions the role of strict liability in accidental infringement cases.
This is not an uncontroversial question. The strict liability standard in patent law is
hotly debated.11 Those in favor of a strict liability standard have argued that a faultbased liability rule would be too administratively costly to implement, that such a
rule may harm the diffusion of new ideas in research environments, and that strict
liability is necessary to ensure the patent holder’s incentives. On the other end of the
spectrum, some argue that patent law ought to include an “independent invention”
defense, under which no liability would attach to making, using, or selling a patented
technology if the defendant independently recreated the patented technology.
Commentators who propose this rule argue that strict liability impedes research and
development and leads to higher patent litigation costs. Some scholars, such as
Chiang12 and Blair and Cotter,13 fall somewhere in the middle of these two poles; it
is on their work that this present Article builds.14

7. While the idea of “inadvertent” patent infringement is not ignored, the nature of these
cases as accidents, and the consequence of that nature, is underexplored. This Article offers
reconceptualization of these cases as accidents. See infra Section I.A.
8. See infra Section II.B.
9. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 47 (2008).
10. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421, 1443 (2009).
11. See infra Section II.C.
12. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2013).
13. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and its Alternatives in Patent
Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799 (2002).
14. See infra Part I.
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Assuming the primary justification for patent rights is utilitarian, this Article
provides a theoretical economic analysis of accidental patent infringement.15 Patent
scholars have already argued that transaction costs prevent technology users and
patentees from ex ante bargaining in cases of patent accidents, and that these cases
should be governed by a liability rule rather than a property rule.16 By asking what
type of liability rule is most appropriate (strict liability or negligence), this Article
extends that analysis one step further. Following models developed in the economics
of accidents literature,17 the Article determines which liability rule will reduce the
total cost society spends on accidental patent infringement. The Article concludes
that a negligence rule best fulfills this goal. Under a strict liability rule, technology
users will adopt reasonable care to avoid accidentally incurring liability, but the
patentee’s incentives to avoid such accidents (e.g., through providing appropriate
notice of their rights) is less than optimal. By contrast, a negligence rule is preferable
because it creates incentives for both technology users and patentees to adopt
reasonable, cost-justified care to avoid accidents. As a result, the number of patent
accidents is reduced, saving society’s resources. More difficult is the question:
Which version of a negligence rule will best achieve this goal? While both a simple
negligence rule and a contributory negligence rule could feasibly improve social
welfare, this Article presents various reasons for preferring a simple negligence
rule.18
To implement such a liability rule, the Article recommends that patent law adopt
a “patent negligence” defense.19 In accident cases, a defendant ought to avoid
liability by proving that she adopted all reasonable care to prevent any accidental
patent infringement. Reasonable care may include performing a diligent search of
the patent register, inspecting relevant products for patent information, or reviewing
the patent portfolios of competitor companies, for example. Implementing such a
reform would involve a modest change to judicial practice. Indeed, United Kingdom
courts already adopt a “quasi-negligence” rule by denying damages in cases where
the defendants did not know of the patent and had no “reasonable grounds” for
supposing such a patent existed.20 In such cases, courts should also use their equitable
discretion to deny injunctive relief. In the United States, under section 287 of the
Patent Act, courts deny damages in cases where the patentee has failed to

15. See infra Part III.
16. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information? 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786–88 (2007) (following the theoretical framework in
Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)). BJ Ard has further argued that property
law adopts less property rules than IP lawyers commonly appreciate, and that IP should
likewise shift to a more liability rule regime. See BJ Ard, More Property Rules than Property:
Revisiting the Right to Exclude in Patent and Copyright, 68 EMORY L.J. 685 (2019).
17. See infra Part III.
18. This Article does also find, however, that the case for negligence in patent law is
weaker than in copyright law due to the existence of mandatory registration in the former but
not the latter. See Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV.
1025 (2016).
19. See infra Section IV.B.
20. See infra Section IV.A.
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appropriately mark patented products.21 As will be seen, this current rule imperfectly
approximates a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence
defense.22 However, rather than focus on the patentee’s level of care, this Article
recommends instead that U.S. courts focus on the user’s level of care, and deny
damages and injunctions when the technology user has taken all reasonable measures
to avoid the infringement occurring. This modification is not only well within the
judiciary’s authority but would also provide a satisfactory middle ground between
proposals to retain the strict liability standard and proposals to adopt an independent
invention defense.
Adopting such a modification has the potential to alleviate many problems in the
contemporary patent system.23 In particular, the proposal would help curb abusive
behavior of nonpracticing entities (or patent “trolls”). Currently, nonpracticing
entities can prey on the inadvertent infringer: by sending a cease and desist letter, the
troll can threaten to shut down small businesses who accidentally infringe the
patent.24 The patent negligence defense, by contrast, would provide a powerful tool
for small businesses in fighting patent troll behavior. Businesses will be able insulate
themselves from litigation claims from trolls by taking steps that a reasonable
company would in order to prevent any accidental infringement; leaving only those
who behave negligently to fight such claims in court. Furthermore, a negligence rule
would provide patentees with incentives to write clearer patent claims, and thus help
address the contemporary concern that the patent system encourages patentees to
strategically word claims in ambiguous ways to receive expanded protection.
At this point, some may object that eliminating strict liability in accident cases
may depress incentives for innovation and thus harm society in the future This Article
responds by demonstrating that adopting a negligence rule may in some instances
cause economic harm to the patentee, but society as a whole will benefit. In 1970,
Guido Calabresi famously demonstrated that the optimal level of personal injury
accidents in tort law was not, contrary to public opinion, zero.25 Road traffic
accidents, in particular, cause severe harm to individuals and broader society.
However, adopting measures to prevent those accidents is also costly. In many cases,
the cost of the measures required to prevent accidents would be greater than the
expected harm caused by the accidents themselves.26 As a result, society makes a
choice to tolerate some road traffic accidents because it is better for society as a
whole. Our goal is not to eliminate all accidents, but instead encourage parties to
invest reasonable, cost-justified levels of resources into accident avoidance.27 The
same is true of patent infringement today. Accidental infringement of patent rights

21. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2018).
22. See infra Section IV.A.
23. See infra Section IV.A.
24. See Markus Reitzig, Joachim Henkel & Christopher Heath, On Sharks, Trolls, and
Their Patent Prey—Unrealistic Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed,”
36 RES. POL’Y 134, 135 (2007) (“[T]he even greater concern of today’s leading R&D
multilaterals of potentially overlooking these (often small) inventors’ patents and being caught
in the trap of inadvertent infringement.”).
25. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 17–23 (1970).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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harms the patentee and, in turn, future society. However, the measures required to
prevent accidental infringement can at times be onerous. In some cases where the
chances of an accident are slim but the costs of avoidance are high, society would be
economically better off by simply letting the accident happen, rather than investing
inefficiently in avoidance mechanisms. As explored in this Article, a negligence rule
achieves this delicate balancing goal.
This Article continues in four Parts. Part I defines accidental infringement of
patents and offers a number of illustrations. This Part explains in more detail the
causes of such accidental infringements and summarizes the literature on the optimal
liability rule in patent law. Part II applies economic theory of accidents to the issue
of patent accidents. The analysis reveals the case for some version of a negligence
liability rule. Part III discusses how best to implement a negligence rule and applies
the suggested rule to demonstrate how such a law would solve a number of
contemporary patent problems. Part IV provides reform recommendations in relation
to U.S. and U.K. law only, with the expectation that lawyers in other jurisdictions
will translate these recommendations into their own domestic laws. Part V briefly
concludes.
I.

PATENT ACCIDENTS

Anglo-American patent law holds all infringers strictly liable.28 Since the
nineteenth century, courts have imposed liability upon anyone who makes, uses, or
sells a patented invention, regardless of whether the defendant’s infringement was
committed intentionally, negligently, or entirely innocently.29 This stands in contrast
to many areas of civil law where a defendant is only accountable for unintentional
injuries if she failed to take reasonable care.30 Yet, as this Part demonstrates,
accidental infringement of patents is all too common. Section A describes accidental
infringement of patents in greater detail. Section B discusses some of the main causes
of patent accidents. Section C reviews the academic literature debating whether
patent liability ought to be imposed strictly or whether some form of a fault standard
should be introduced.

28. For an alternative interpretation, see Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort
Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV. 571 (2016) (arguing that patent infringement requires
intentional conduct). Cf. Patrick R. Goold, Intent in Patent Infringement, 68 FLA. L. REV.
FORUM 93 (2016) (arguing that intentional conduct, in both trespass and patent infringement,
is not a fault standard). For a related discussion of “objective” fault standards in the area of
indirect patent infringement, see Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent
Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575 (2011).
29. Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587, 607–08 (1850) (“The intent not to [infringe] . . . never
exonerates . . . from all damage for the actual injury or encroachment, though it may mitigate
[damages].”); ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 292 (1883) (“To constitute an infringement of a patent, it is not necessary that the
infringer should have known of the existence of the patent at the time he infringed it; or,
knowing of its existence, it is not necessary that he should have known his doings to constitute
an infringement.”). See generally Lynda J. Oswald, The “Strict Liability” of Direct Patent
Infringement, 19 VA. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993, 999–1005 (2017).
30. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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A. The Anatomy of Patent Accidents
Broadly speaking, patent infringement can be usefully divided into two types:
intentional and accidental. For the purposes of this Article, patent infringement is
“intentional” when, prior to the infringement, the defendant was aware that her
planned course of action would involve patent infringement but nevertheless engaged
in such conduct. For example, if A owns a patent on a new type of mousetrap, and B
knowingly sells copies of the mousetrap in order to undercut A in the market.31 Like
all forms of intentional tort, determining whether the wrongdoing is intentional
requires, in theory, an understanding of the defendant’s subjective state of mind.32
However, as it is difficult to accurately discern the content of a defendant’s mental
state, in common judicial practice, intent is typically inferred from more objective
factors which serve as suitable proxies.33 Courts routinely find intent in patent
infringement cases by examining the probabilistic relationship between the
defendant’s conduct and the likelihood of infringement; if prior to commencing the
conduct there was a near certainty that such conduct would involve a patent
infringement, courts are likely to find patent infringement was intended.34
Equally, however, patent infringement may be accidental. While patent lawyers
are aware that infringement may be “inadvertent,”35 the nature of these cases as

31. The concept of “intent” in patent law, as in law and philosophy generally, is debated.
Peter Cane describes the concept of intent as being used “loosely” in tort law, sometimes used
to refer to voluntariness, sometimes used to refer to describe motive. Peter Cane, Mens Rea in
Tort Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 533, 555 (2000). Nevertheless, the use of “intent” in this
article is relatively definite. As used here, the term intent is used synonymously with the use
of “willfulness” when assessing patent damages. See generally Matthew D. Powers & Steven
C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51
SYRACUSE L. REV. 53 (2001). Thus, intentional patent infringement, as used here, involves
some element of mens rea in the literal sense of a guilty or blameworthy mental state. As a
result, simply performing some conduct deliberately which later turns out to be a patent
infringement but without awareness of the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of acting,
is not regarded as intentional here (and accordingly this Article’s use of intent is not to be
confused with that in Vishnubhakat, supra note 28). However, this Article is not a work of
conceptual analysis, and I do not claim that this is the only, or in some sense “right,”
understanding of intent in patent law. The intentional-accidental divide the Article draws is
used primarily to define the boundaries of a class of accidental infringement cases which, as
we shall see, requires a separate consideration if the law is to reach an efficient allocation of
resources.
32. See Cane, supra note 31, at 534 (describing the core of intent as involving some
element of “choice,” which is necessarily subjective).
33. Famously, in legal literature, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. argued this point. OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 27 (1881). Albeit, Holmes may well have been arguing
that the law never truly imposes liability depending on subjective mental states, but in fact
‘really’ imposes external and objective standards of conduct. This idea has continued through
many economists understanding of intentional tort law to today. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 149–59 (1987).
34. See Halo Elec., Inc. v. Pulse Elec., Inc. 126 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (describing
culpability in tort law as “generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time
of the challenged conduct”).
35. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 46–72.
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accidents, and their connection to other types of legal accidents, has not been
explored. Frequently in social life, individuals engage in activities which are overall
beneficial for society but which, as a by-product, pose a risk of harm to others around
us. At the time the individual engages in the relevant conduct, it is far from certain
that the conduct will harm someone else, although it is surely possible. Sometimes
that risk materializes into a reality and causes harm to others, even though that is not
our desire or intention.36 A classic example is driving automobiles: on balance this
activity is beneficial, though it imposes risk of harm on others. Sometimes those risks
materialize, and individuals are injured, although that was an outcome that no one
wished to occur. The same situation occurs frequently in patent law. The process of
innovation is socially beneficial, but it comes with risks attached: every time an
inventor creates or commercializes a product or process, there is a risk that doing so
might infringe the patent rights of an earlier inventor. As we shall see in the following
examples, sometimes that risk materializes and patent infringements occur, although
that was clearly not the desire of any party. Given the choice, both parties would
have tried to avoid this unfortunate outcome. These cases in turn pose an important
and thorny policy question. Who should bear the cost of the accident, the innocent
patentee, or the innocent user who did not wish for this outcome to happen? Should
the harm lie where it falls, or ought we use the law to shift the responsibility to the
user?
Accidental infringement takes a number of forms. These can be grouped into three
broad categories. The most basic form of accidental infringement occurs when the
user of the patented invention is aware that he or she is using some form of
technology but is unaware of the existence of a patent. Perhaps the most discussed
example of this occurring is the NTP case described in the introduction.37 In this case,
RIM was engaged in a beneficial activity: inventing new types of pagers and cell
phones that allowed individuals to receive e-mails wirelessly.38 When they started
this activity, RIM was, or at the very least ought to have been, aware that such
technical activity could possibly infringe the patents of a prior inventor. Ultimately,
this risk materialized, and a patent infringement did result. However, this was clearly
not RIM’s intention; quite the opposite in fact.39 RIM did not desire to commit a
patent infringement, and if it was reasonably certain to them that their conduct would
have amounted to a patent infringement, they likely would have avoided such
infringement by licensing the technology from NTP. However, such ex ante
bargaining was impossible due lack of ownership information available to RIM. This

36. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1 (1987) (“[B]y ‘accidents’
I mean harmful outcomes that neither injurers nor victims wished to occur—although either
might have affected the likelihood or severity of the outcomes.”). Following this definition
provided by Shavell, both negligent and non-negligent unintentional wrongs is described in
this Article as accidental. This may differ from some ordinary uses of the term ‘accident’
which, for some, may refer only to non-negligent unintentional wrongs. This Article prefers
to follow the more specific definition of accident found in the economic literature as opposed
to the ordinary language interpretation of the term.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 1–6.
38. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751 (D. Va. 2003).
39. Id. at 755 (noting that RIM invented the technology before awareness of NTP’s
patents).
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resulted in RIM not only making and selling an infringing product but also investing
substantial and irretrievable resources into a telecommunications network on which
the phones would operate.40
Similar problems arise when the technology user is the end consumer. At the start
of twentieth century, patent attorney and inventor George Selden owned a U.S. patent
for an “improved road engine” powered by a “liquid-hydrocarbon engine of the
compression type.”41 Selden claimed that Ford’s Model T automobile infringed the
patent.42 While Selden sued Ford, he also threatened Ford consumers, advertising
that anyone who bought a Model T would also “buy a lawsuit.”43 Many consumers
were likely unaware that, by using the Model T, they were “using” technology
allegedly subject to a patent and thus possibly themselves infringing the patent. From
their perspective, these consumers were merely engaged in a socially beneficial
activity—driving—and were largely unaware that this doing so came with a risk of
patent infringement. Ironically, Selden’s threat to sue consumers for using the Model
T helpfully limited the risk of such accidental infringements of the patent occurring!
The problem of suing unwary consumers continues today.44 Consider for
example, the case of the Innovatio lawsuits.45 Innovatio acquired patent rights to
certain wireless internet technologies from Broadcom.46 Rather than sue the
manufacturers of wireless devices such as routers, like Motorola and Cisco,
Innovatio instead sued consumers for buying and using the devices.47 Innovatio then
sent more than 8000 infringement letters to, and initiated twenty-three lawsuits
against, small businesses that had bought the wireless devices and were using them,
for example, to provide internet to their consumers.48 Restaurants, cafes, hotels,
bakeries, etc. were alleged to be “using” the patented technology and thus infringing
their rights.49 Much like the purchasers of the Model T, most, if not all, of the
consumers Innovatio threatened were completely unaware of the existence of a
patent on the technology they used.

40. See RESEARCH IN MOTION, HISTORY (2006) (RIM had signed wireless handheld
supply contracts with American Mobile, IBM, and Rogers Cantel (now AT&T)).
41. U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (filed May 8, 1879).
42. JAMES J. FLINK, THE AUTOMOBILE AGE 51–55 (1988).
43. Id. Ford subsequently countered by offering to bond his customers against any patent
infringement suit.
44. See generally Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C.
L. REV. 1443 (2014); Colleen Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being
Sued En Masse for Patent Infringement & What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 235
(2014) (chronicling the increasing importance of end users over time in patent conflicts). For
further examples of end users being brought into patent litigation, see Daniel Nazer, Actually,
Mr. Waxman, Consumers are Sued for Patent Infringement All the Time, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/actually-mr-wax
man-consumers-are-sued-patent-infringement-all-time [https://perma.cc/E7CW-UKLL].
45. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp 2d 903, 906 (N.D.
Ill. 2013).
46. Id. at 907.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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A variation on this form of accidental infringement occurs when the user of the
technology is aware of the patent but is unaware of a relevant patent claim. A famous
example of such a situation is the Rambus case.50 Rambus developed and patented
computer memory technology used in semiconductor memory devices.51 Like NTP,
Rambus was a patent assertion entity whose primary business was the licensing of
the patented technology.52 In 1990, Rambus applied to the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office (USPTO) for a patent over its “Dynamic Random Access Memory”
technology.53 In 1992, Rambus joined the Joint Electronic Devices Engineering
Council (JEDEC), a standard setting organization that developed standards for
semiconductor technologies.54 JEDEC had a written patent policy encouraging the
adoption of standards free of patented items or processes. Furthermore, the policy
also required members to disclose patents and patent applications “related to” the
standardization of the work of the Council. In 1993, Rambus disclosed their patent
to the group.55 While Rambus was a member, JEDEC adopted a standard for
synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM) to be used by
semiconductor manufacturers.56 Semiconductor manufacturers then began to
manufacture chips using SDRAM technology.57 In 1995, Rambus withdrew from
JEDEC and filed a number of “continuations” on the original patent (continuations
allow the patent holder to modify or add additional claims to the patent at a later date
in order to broaden its scope).58 These continuations ripened into issued patents
between 1997 and 1999. Rambus then sued Infineon, a manufacturer of
semiconductor memory devices (including SDRAM), and a member of JEDEC, for
infringement of the recently issued patents. While antitrust and fraud actions began
against Rambus, the patent was successfully enforced against Infineon, despite their
lack of knowledge of the patent claim. More broadly, the story highlights how
strategically hiding claims, particularly through the use of continuations, can
contribute to patent accidents.59
The second form of accidental infringement occurs when the defendant is aware
that she is using technology that is subject to a patent but believes that she is
operating outside the patent’s scope. A classic example of this is the Polaroid v.

50. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 874 (2003).
51. Id. at 1084.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1085.
55. Namely U.S. Patent No. 5,243,703 (filed Mar. 5, 1992), a divisional of the patent
application Serial No. 07/510,898.
56. Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1085.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1084. Perhaps even more unsettling, Rambus learned information through their
participation in the standard setting process that allowed them to write claims that covered the
standard. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 62.
59. Many proposals have been made to end such abuse. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley &
Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004). But
yet the problem of hidden claims remains. Particularly troublesome are cases where the
patentee adds or modifies claims (to the extent their initial written description allows) to
anticipate new products produced by competitors. See id. at 74–76.
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Kodak case.60 Polaroid had long dominated the instant camera market until Kodak
decided to enter the sector in the 1970s. Kodak was aware that Polaroid owned
several patents on instant camera technology and that inventing their own instant
camera came with a substantial risk of patent infringement. To reduce this risk,
Kodak hired a top patent lawyer to work with their technical staff.61 The patent
lawyer gave advice about design choices to avoid infringement.62 At the end of the
process, Kodak produced a camera that worked in a way entirely in reverse of the
Polaroid product.63 Nevertheless, Polaroid sued Kodak and received significant
damages.64 The judge praised Kodak for taking such care to avoid infringement, but
nevertheless found them liable.65 These types of accidental infringement may be
called “boundary accidents” rather than “ownership accidents,” as the defendant is
aware of who owns the technology, but is simply unaware of the scope of the patent
right. In this Article, we shall put “boundary accidents” to one side, and thus avoid
assessing the merits of “designing around patents” for the time being. The focus in
this Article is more firmly on ownership accidents.
Of course, the boundaries between ownership and boundary accidents blur in
some cases, as illustrated by the E-Data controversy. In the 1980s, Charles Freeny
invented a kiosk that was used by consumers in retail stores to create digital audio
tapes.66 However, the patent issued on the technology was vaguely and amorphously
written.67 The U.S. patent provided the patent holder with the exclusive rights to a
“system for reproducing information in material objects at a point of sale location.”68
In the early 2000s, the patent holding company E-Data argued that the scope of this
patent’s monopoly covered a wide range of e-commerce.69 Companies such as
Microsoft and IBM were, allegedly, infringing the patent by selling downloadable
music and software over the internet.70 E-Data sent out seventy-five thousand letters
to websites, offering licenses and, in return, promising not to bring legal action.71

60. Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also
RONALD K. FIERSTEIN, A TRIUMPH OF GENIUS: EDWIN LAND, POLAROID, AND THE KODAK
PATENT WAR 117–250 (2015) (outlining the initial conflict and early stages of litigation in
this case).
61. Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 76–1634–MA, 1990 WL 324105, at *76
(D. Mass. 1990) (“During the lengthy and detailed patent clearance process he performed
for Kodak, Mr. Carr considered over 250 Polaroid and non-Polaroid patents and rendered 67
written and countless oral opinions on both the film and camera patents.”).
62. Id.
63. Id. at *76–79 (comparing the Kodak and Polaroid products).
64. Id.
65. Id. at *79 (stating that the record “shows a patent clearance process that could serve
as a model for what the law requires”).
66. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 8–10.
67. Id.; see also Seth Shulman, IP’s Bleak House, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 1, 2001),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/400914/ips-bleak-house [https://perma.cc/865Q-Y75]
(citing the Freeny patent as an example of an “absurdly broad patent” that is “fuzzy” and
“likely to stymie innovation”).
68. U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643 col. 1 (filed July 9, 1985).
69. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 8–10.
70. Id.
71. See MCNISH & SILCOFF, supra note 1, at 2.
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Certainly, a large amount of these companies were unaware of the Freeny patent (and
had committed an “ownership accident”). The boundaries of the patent were so
vaguely demarcated that companies such as Microsoft and IBM were not aware that
the technology they had adopted was subject to a patent right. These types of
accidents accordingly fall within the scope of this Article’s concern.
Lastly, in some cases the user is completely unaware he or she is using the
underlying technology. A famous, albeit controversial, example of this concerns the
Monsanto Roundup Ready Canola seeds. In 2005, Percy Schmeiser, a Canadian
farmer, was subject to a Canadian Supreme Court case.72 Monsanto found canola on
Schmeiser’s farm which had been grown from Monsanto’s patented Roundup Ready
Canola seeds.73 Schmeiser maintained that he had grown this genetically modified
crop accidentally.74 Schmeiser argued that other farmers in the area were growing
Roundup Ready Canola and that the wind had moved seeds from the neighbors’ crops
onto his land, causing him to inadvertently grow the crop.75 While this account of
events was disputed, the issue presented has long concerned farmers. In the United
States, the Organic Seeds Growers and Trade Association sued Monsanto alleging
that preventing this form of “contamination” of their organic crops required
significant expenditure on their part (e.g., erecting hedges and wind barriers, rotating
special and temporal crops).76 Both the Canadian and U.S. Supreme Courts have
declined to determine the patent liability of those who accidentally grow patented
seeds.77
B. The Causes of Patent Accidents
There are many causes of the patent accident problem, most of which are welldocumented.78 In part, the problem is somewhat unavoidable due to the innate
difficulties in assigning property rights in intangibles. The boundaries of patent rights

72. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.). The case was
controversial because after the seeds had “accidentally” blown onto Schmeiser’s land,
Schmeiser replanted the seeds in a way that was arguably an intentional infringement of the
patent. This case has received much academic commentary. See, e.g., Jessica Lynd, Gone with
the Wind: Why Even Utility Patents Cannot Fence in Self-Replicating Technologies, 62 AM.
U. L. REV. 663 (2013).
73. Monsanto Can. Inc. [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 911 para. 5.
74. Id. at 912 para. 6.
75. See id.
76. See Organic Seeds Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544,
548 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Seed businesses and farmers may, at some expense, test their seeds
and crops to ensure that no contamination has occurred, and non-transgenic farmers may
establish buffer zones between themselves and farmers using transgenic seed in order to reduce
the risk of cross-transmission.”).
77. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 288–89 (2013) (declining to rule on the
issue of patent exhaustion in cases of technologies which replicate outside direct human
control); Monsanto Can. Inc., [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 911 para. 2 (Can.) (“In reaching this
conclusion, we emphasize from the outset that we are not concerned here with the innocent
discovery by farmers of ‘blow-by’ patented plants on their land or in their cultivated fields.”).
78. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 38–45 (describing why property
rights fail at times).
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will always be elusive simply because of the fundamental difficulties of describing
an invention in words. This fundamental problem contributes significantly to cases
such as Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.79 However, beyond these difficulties,
there are further causes which are less intractable; causes which, with appropriate
policy responses, could be counteracted.
One notable cause is the presence of “patent thickets.” Some industry sectors
contain “dense web[s] of overlapping intellectual property rights” that companies
must spend countless hours scouring in order to commercialize a new product.80 A
classic example of this problem is the smartphone industry. One estimate suggests
that 250,000 active patents impact the smartphone industry today.81 Incorporating
Bluetooth 3.0 technology into a phone requires the producer to locate and license
over 30,000 patents alone.82 Finding all the relevant patents and their owners is for
most smartphone producers a Sisyphean task. As a result, some commentators go as
far as to say that full patent clearance is simply impossible.83 Under such
circumstances, some accidental infringement is very hard to avoid.84 Producing new
smartphones is clearly a socially valuable activity, but doing so imposes very obvious
risks of accidentally infringing the patent of another company. While there are
measures one can take to reduce those risks (e.g., by searching the register), those
measures are of dubious efficacy and would involve a very significant investment of
resources. Furthermore, the problem is hardly limited to smartphones but affects
“virtually every modern device, such as a computer, television, or car.”85 In the
United Kingdom, Ian Hargreaves’s “Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual
Property and Growth” found that emerging patent thickets were obstructing entry to
some key markets and thus impeding innovation.86

79. 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
80. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 120 (2000).
81. Mike Masnick, There Are 250,000 Active Patents that Impact Smartphones;
Representing One in Six Active Patents Today, TECHDIRT (Oct. 18, 2012, 8:28 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121017/10480520734/there-are-250000-active-patents
-that-impact-s [https://perma.cc/S8V7-GGYK].
82. Evan Engstrom, So How Many Patents Are in a Smartphone?, ENGINE (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.engine.is/news/category/so-how-many-patents-are-in-a-smartphone [https://per
ma.cc/AF25-T3UN] (“Consider Bluetooth 3.0—a technology incorporating the contributions
of more than 30,000 patent holders, including 200 universities . . . .”).
83. See Chiang, supra note 12, at 15–17.
84. However, some have also questioned how significant the patent thicket problem really
is. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1313 (2017); Jonathan M. Barnett, Are There Really Patent Thickets?, REGULATION,
Winter 2016–17, at 14, https://gould.usc.edu/assets/docs/directory/1000201.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/J8A4-KLVH] (doubting that patent thickets persist for any significant period of time
because the market has incentives to arrange ways to avoid the problems—e.g., patent pools).
85. Chiang, supra note 12, at 16.
86. Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth
10 (May 2011), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview-finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV75-774U]. For
alternative solutions to the patent thicket issue, see Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton, Yotam Kapan
& Maayan Perel, Recoupment Patent, 98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020).
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The second cause of note is the “notice failure” problem.87 Ideally, patents on the
patent register should give others in society accurate information about the existence
and boundaries of the patent. The clearer the description of the claimed invention,
the easier it is for producers to avoid patent infringement. However, Bessen and
Meurer find the U.S. patent system to be “critically deficient in this regard.”88 As the
E-Data and Kodak cases illustrate, patent documents often do not provide sufficient
notice to the public of the scope of patents. Judge Learned Hand once stated that
patent claims can be “such a waste of abstract verbiage” that it “takes the scholastic
ingenuity of a St. Thomas with the patience of a yogi to decipher their meaning.”89
The result is not only that accidental “boundary” type infringements occur (as in
Kodak) but also producers find it more difficult to discover whether a technology is
owned and by whom (leading to the “ownership” type accidents). As Bessen and
Meurer continue to describe, notice failure plays a “crucial role” in leading to
inadvertent infringement, which is central to the “pattern of litigation over time” and
ensuing rising costs of the patent system.90
Furthermore, the notice failure problem is not attributable simply to the innate
difficulties of demarcating property rights in intangibles, but is, in large measure, a
problem of institutional design. As Menell and Meurer demonstrate, the current
patent system does not provide patent holders with sufficient incentives to provide
the public with adequate notice.91 Instead, inventors frequently can “benefit from
obfuscating the scope of rights and keeping others in the dark about their intellectual
property.”92 At the root of the problem is an externality-based market failure:
ownership and boundary information is a public good; when the patentee supplies
this information, she benefits others in society but does not benefit from doing so
herself.93 As a result, the patentee faces suboptimal incentives to provide this
information to the public.94 In fact, the opposite is the case: often the patentee can
“benefit from strategically hiding, obfuscating, and distorting such information.”95
For example, in relation to the NTP case, Menell and Meurer highlight how NTP was
in a stronger bargaining position after RIM had “unwittingly invested heavily in a
potentially infringing wireless e-mail technology.”96 As a result, NTP “clearly
benefited from its patents not being easily known.”97 Rambus provides a similar
example of such behavior.

87. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 147 (“Simply put, notice failure and the
resulting inadvertent infringement are central to the failure of patents to provide positive
innovation incentives.”); Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice
Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 14 (2013).
88. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 46.
89. Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 229 F. 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1916).
90. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 147.
91. See Menell & Meurer, supra note 87, at 6.
92. Id. at 1.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 8–9.
97. Id. at 9.
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Similarly, by seeking broad and vague claims, the patentee “maximizes the
likelihood that the patent can be stretched to reach unforeseen competing
technologies,” (as illustrated by the E-Data case).98 A “good” patent drafter will
therefore try to construct claims to be ambiguous enough so that they can be read
narrowly during patent examination and broadly during patent litigation. In some
cases, this involves cynical obfuscation techniques. Janet Freilich recently
demonstrated the problem of “patent clutter.”99 An astonishing twenty-five percent
of claim language in her sample of U.S. patents was not about the patent’s core
invention.100 While there are many potential reasons why patent holders may choose
to “pad” their patent claims with irrelevant language, one clear reason is that doing
so makes the patent document harder to read and understand, thus introducing
ambiguity that may be exploited in litigation to ensure the broadest scope of
protection possible.101
C. Literature Review
A number of commentators have questioned the liability rule applying to
unintentional patent infringements. Broadly, these scholars have proposed three
different solutions. The first two solutions are the most fully explored. These are
either to maintain the strict liability standard, or alternatively, to adopt an
independent invention defense. The last option is to adopt some form of negligence
rule. This Section outlines these proposals in turn.
1. Strict Liability Proposals
The first option is to maintain the current strict liability rule for one who
accidentally makes, uses, or sells a patented product. Writing in 2002, Blair and
Cotter compared strict liability rules and negligence rules for governing patent
infringement.102 The authors concluded that strict liability was preferable to
negligence liability for administrative cost reasons.103 If patent law adopted a
negligence rule, courts would be required to assess whether the defendant behaved
reasonably.104 This would require courts to make a decision about the optimal amount
of care the defendant should exercise (e.g., how much time should the patent holder
search the register for or whether it would be reasonable for the patent holder to seek
an infringement opinion letter from an attorney or patent office). As strict liability
does not require such a costly judicial analysis, they concluded strict liability was
preferable to negligence.
Nevertheless, Blair and Cotter did find that a “modified” strict liability rule,
wherein liability was strictly imposed but damages were eliminated for those who

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 33.
Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 IOWA L. REV. 925 (2018).
Id. at 948.
Id. at 968.
Blair & Cotter, supra note 13.
See id. at 821–29.
Id. at 826.
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infringed without actual or constructive notice of the patent, was the optimal rule.105
In particular, the authors argued that conditioning damages upon constructive notice
(through product marking) would incentivize the patentee to take care to reduce the
chances of inadvertent infringement.106 Furthermore, the authors found that in some
instances placing the entire responsibility to avoid inadvertent infringement upon the
technology user could lead to the technology user taking socially excessive care.107
As a result, although literature routinely cites Blair and Cotter for supporting the
strict liability regime, their proposed liability regime is in fact closer to a negligence
rule than is commonly perceived. As will be expanded upon in Part IV, the Blair and
Cotter proposal is best described as a strict liability rule accompanied by a
contributory negligence defense (i.e. the user will be strictly liable for damages
unless she can show the patent holder failed to take reasonable care to avoid the
infringement by providing adequate notice).108 As later sections explore more fully,
this proposal has many of the same benefits of a more straightforward negligence
rule. Nevertheless, the proposal differs from such a rule in the following ways: the
contributory negligence standard is defined using a bright line rule (i.e. appropriate
marking) rather than a vague standard (i.e. did the patentee take “reasonable care”)
and the patentee who is contributorily negligent nevertheless receives injunctive
relief.109
More recently, Robert Merges has partially defended the strict liability rule.110
Merges focused particularly on whether courts should hold those who do not
deliberately copy a patented invention strictly liable, or alternatively, not liable at all
(absent proof of deliberate copying).111 Merges concludes, tentatively, that such
innocent infringers ought to be held liable. Merges asked the question: whether
“there is anything to be said for the absolute liability standard”?112 To answer,
Merges makes a “tentative start in the direction of defending the current doctrine.”113
The strict liability rule was defended for two reasons. First, in many cases, the cost
for the patent holder of proving copying would be very high, thus limiting the
compensation they receive from their invention.114 Second, the strict liability
standard may increase the dissemination of the technology.115 If an independent
invention defense is introduced in patent law, defendant companies would limit their
contact with patent holders and the information its researchers have access to in order
to increase the chances that, should an infringement occur, the independent invention
defense would apply.116 By contrast, under strict liability, the defendant’s liability

105. See id. at 830.
106. Id. at 834.
107. Id. at 825.
108. See infra Section IV.A.
109. Id.
110. Robert Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law,
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2016).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 6.
115. Id. at 6–7.
116. Id.
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does not depend on their level of knowledge, and thus companies have less incentive
to keep their researchers in the dark about existing patents.117
Lastly, some commentators have suggested introducing a compulsory licensing
regime in cases of accidental patent infringement. For example, Lemley and Weiser
argue that in cases where transaction costs significantly reduce the ability of the
patentee and the technology user from bargaining for a license, a “liability rule”
ought to be implemented (e.g., an obligation to pay damages rather than a “property
rule”; an obligation to stop using the technology until receiving the owner’s
permission).118 This proposal would cover accident cases wherein the technology
owner and the patentee often cannot bargain ex ante. What the authors do not
question is what type of liability rule ought to be in place: strict liability or
negligence? This Article agrees that a property rule ought to give way to a liability
rule. But a compulsory licensing regime, where damages must be paid upon every
accidental infringement, is a version of a strict liability regime. Part III considers
whether the duty to pay damages ought not be so strictly imposed but instead only
awarded where the defendant failed to take reasonable care to prevent the
infringement.
2. Independent Invention Proposals
On the other end of the spectrum, some commentators argue that patent law
should adopt an “independent invention” defense (i.e., a defense for making, using,
or selling patented technology when the user has independently recreated the
technology, rather than copying it from an existing technology). In 2002, Maurer and
Scotchmer proposed that such a defense would be beneficial for social welfare.119
The authors posited that two positive consequences would occur, should such a
defense be introduced. First, the authors found that the threat of entry by independent
invention would encourage patent holders to license patented technology more
frequently and at lower prices, thus increasing access to the technology.120 In a
system with an independent invention defense, it would make financial sense for the
patentee to deter independent investors from entering the market through licensing
the technology below the price set in a regime without an independent invention
defense. The authors argue that while the patentee would receive a lower profit, his
licensing revenue would still exceed the amount necessary to cover research and
development (R&D) costs. Second, the authors posit that such a doctrine would limit
the amount of investment into patent “races.”121

117. Id. at 37.
118. Lemley & Wiser, supra note 16; see also Ard, supra note 16, at 697–700 (making
the case for why IP ought to adopt liability rules).
119. Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in
Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 541 (2002). For another proposal relating to
independent inventions, see Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law,
98 GEO. L.J. 1643 (2010) (explaining and analyzing a “free entry” reform proposal initially
put forth by Judge Learned Hand).
120. See Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 119, at 535–36.
121. Id. at 540–41.
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The common counterargument to any proposal to adopt an independent invention
defense is that such a doctrine would negatively affect inventors’ incentives to create.
This was partially a concern raised in the original Maurer and Scotchmer article.122
The Maurer-Scotchmer proposals were based on a model of innovation wherein the
costs of R&D was relatively low.123 If this assumption is relaxed and R&D costs are
particularly high (e.g., such as pharmaceutical research where ex ante probability of
success of producing a patentable invention are low), then the authors found that an
independent invention defense could indeed undercut incentives to invent. To avoid
this problem, Maurer and Scotchmer speculate that a legislature could, should it
desire, adopt a series of statutory exemptions to the independent invention defense.124
But this raises the problem, as stated by Blair and Cotter, that it leads to rent-seeking
as certain industries lobby to be qualified as an exempted industry.125
Subsequent commentators have debated whether such a doctrine would diminish
inventors’ profits too greatly. In 2006, Samson Vermont offered a novel argument in
favor of an independent-invention defense.126 While acknowledging that such a
defense would limit patent holder profits, Vermont concluded that the reduction in
expected profit is likely to have only a moderate effect on incentives to invent.127
Vermont argues that many inventions are created by more than one person in quick
succession, and this is particularly true of highly socially valuable inventions (for
example, the lightbulb by Edison and Swann or the telephone by Bell and Gray).128
Vermont argues the fact that an invention could be invented by multiple people is
evidence that a moderate reduction in profits, such as that which would come from
allowing an independent invention defense, is unlikely to harm incentives to create;
it is likely that the reduced profits will be enough to motivate at least one inventor to
create the invention. However, some commentators are not convinced by this
argument. While acknowledging the reasoning, Mark Lemley responds that the
“stakes are quite high” and that, if an independent invention defense would
significantly reduce the incentives to innovate, then “the potential losses for society
are substantial,” and this is particularly relevant in the class of high social utility
inventions that Vermont discusses.129 Lemley concludes that he is “not yet confident
that an independent invention defense will have no undue effect on incentives.” 130
3. Negligence Proposals
Relatively few commentators have explicitly explored the use of negligence
liability in patent law. However, there has been some recent thought in this direction.

122. See id. at 543–44.
123. Id. at 543.
124. See id. at 544.
125. Blair & Cotter, supra note 13, at 813.
126. See Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement,
105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006).
127. Id. at 480.
128. Id. at 478–79.
129. Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2007).
130. Id. at 1530.
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In 2012, Stewart Sterk suggested that property law in general, and intellectual
property law in specific, should adopt negligence rules more frequently.131 Indeed,
Sterk highlighted that, contrary to common wisdom, property law often relies on
negligence rules (or “proxies” for negligence rules) in certain circumstances.132
These rules apply often “where ascertaining the scope of boundaries is costly.” 133
Sterk cites “reasonable encroachers” as an example: where a defendant inadvertently
builds on the land of another after commissioning a survey to determine the precise
boundary between the land, courts will often use doctrines such as “relative
hardship” to defeat any claim brought on behalf of the property owner.134 Sterk
argues that courts recognize that, in such circumstances, the defendant has taken
reasonable care to avoid the infringement and proxy rules are applied to excuse the
infringement.135 By contrast, if a defendant builds on a neighbor’s land in direct
contrast to the survey’s conclusions, courts typically require the defendant to remove
the encroachment.136
Nevertheless, Sterk’s article, while presenting a novel and interesting argument,
is incomplete in some important respects. Most importantly, the analyticaltheoretical framework used to decide whether a negligence rule ought to be imposed
could be improved. Sterk accurately highlights how it is costly to discern the
existence and scope of IP rights.137 But that itself does not explain why a negligence
rule, as opposed to a strict liability rule, is appropriate.138 There is a justificatory
“gap” in the paper. To fill in this gap, we require a more defined and robust normative
framework in place before we can answer these questions fully. Part III of this Article
supplies and applies that analytical-normative framework.
In a similar vein, Tun-Jen Chiang recommends that patent law, in theory, should
adopt a “contributory search” defense to infringement actions (akin to a contributory

131. Stewart E. Sterk, Strict Liability and Negligence in Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 2129 (2012).
132. Id. at 2133.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2146–47.
135. See id. at 2136.
136. Id. at 2145.
137. Id.
138. Sterk’s article does make some moves to justify the use of negligence rules by
appealing to the concept of information costs. However, information cost theory is more
helpful when determining how to define property rights, than on the question of fault. As
discussed in the work of Henry Smith, property rights can be delineated using either exclusion
or governance strategies. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies
for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL. STUD. S453, S453 (2002). The choice of an
exclusion strategy or a governance strategy ought to be made by comparing the benefit that
more precisely delineated property rights would provide against the cost of acquiring the
additional information required to delineate such rights. Once property rights are so defined,
there is a separate question, discussed in this Article (i.e., whether all infringements of those
rights should result in liability or only those infringements which result from carelessness). As
Part III elaborates upon, this decision must be made by examining the possible effects that
liability rules have on parties’ incentives to invest efficient levels of resources in accident
avoidance.
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negligence defense).139 While patent doctrine typically expects producers to search
for patentees, Chiang argues that, in some circumstances, it is in fact easier for
patentees to search for producers.140 Consider for example, the Rambus case
discussed earlier.141 As Rambus was aware of the patent and the potential for
infringement, it was easier for Rambus to alert Infineon to the presence of the patent
claims than it was for Infineon to discover Rambus’s entitlements.142 Likewise, in
some industries, such as the smartphone industry where there are many patentees but
relatively few producers, it may also be easier for the patentees to keep track of the
use of their proprietary technology than require producers to clear all patents.143 To
reduce the chances of inadvertent infringement, Chiang argues that patent law needs
some doctrinal mechanism to encourage the least cost searcher—whether that is
patentee or producer—to conduct appropriate searches. The tool for the job is,
theoretically, a contributory search (or contributory negligence) defense. Inadvertent
infringers ought to be able to avoid liability if they can show that in fact the patentee
was best placed to avoid the infringement. By introducing such a defense, companies
like Rambus would no longer benefit from hiding their patent claims, and thus the
chances of inadvertent infringement would be minimized.
Nevertheless, questions remain after Chiang’s article. Like Sterk’s article, there
is the question of which type of negligence rule is preferable. Why, for example, is a
strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense preferable
when a simple negligence rule (or indeed a comparative negligence rule) would be
equally capable of encouraging the producer search? Furthermore, neither Sterk nor
Chiang directly address a number of “secondary considerations” which need to be
considered before proposing some form of negligence rule. These include, for
example, the administrative cost of such a rule and the likelihood of judicial errors.
Similarly, Chiang’s article is also somewhat limited in scope. The article is focused
primarily on encouraging patent holders to search for technology users.144 However,
there are arguably other ways that the patent holder could prevent accidents outside
of searching for technology users, such as by fixing appropriate notice to the work
or by writing clearer patent claims. Ideally, the question of strict liability versus
negligence should consider whether the chosen liability rule encourages the patent
holder to take these other important precautionary measures as well. 145 Lastly, as will

139. Chiang, supra note 12, at 36. Practical difficulties with contributory search defenses
lead Chiang to ultimately adopt a more modest proposal of amending the current damages
framework. Id. at 43–50.
140. See id. at 12.
141. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see supra text
accompanying notes 50–59.
142. Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1102–05; see Chiang, supra note 12, at 12–13.
143. Chiang, supra note 12, at 5 (“[I]f there are a small number of well-known producers
(e.g., a few large companies dominate an industry) but thousands of small and unknown
patentees, then it would be more efficient to have patentees look for producers than to have
producers look for patentees.”).
144. Id. at 64.
145. See Liivak, supra note 119 (similarly arguing that accidental patent infringement is a
bilateral accident wherein incentives need to be set for both parties to take adequate
precautionary measures).

1096

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:1075

be elaborated upon in Part III, this Article employs a slightly different, but arguably
more standard, set of theoretical models to analyze the problem. 146
What is needed at this stage is a more analytical approach to the question of strict
liability versus negligence in patent law. While Sterk’s and Chiang’s research
provides important insights, this Article builds on their work by providing a less
analogical approach (that focuses on highlighting similarities with tort law) and a
more analytical dissection of the costs and benefits associated with a negligence rule
in patent law. It is to that analysis that the Article now turns.
II. THE CASE FOR NEGLIGENCE
The primary justification for patent rights is utilitarian: patent rights are desirable
to the extent they maximize the common good.147 In this Article, it is assumed that
an efficient use of resources will maximize society’s welfare and thus contribute to
the common good. But what liability rule will incentivize an efficient use of
resources? Using economic models of accidents from the law of torts, Section A
begins by fleshing out the concept of welfare maximization in this context. Contrary
to common belief, society’s welfare will not be best served by attempting to stop all
accidental infringements. Instead, the goal for policymakers should be to encourage
parties to take cost-justified measures to avoid accidental infringement. Sections B
and C compare various liability rules in relation to this goal. Section D concludes
that some form of a negligence liability rule is optimal because a negligence rule
incentivizes cost-justified accident prevention from all relevant parties. This Part
finds that the best liability rule is either a simple negligence rule or a strict liability
rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense and explains some further
reasons for preferring a simple negligence rule.
A. The Social Cost of Patent Accidents
Accidental infringement of patents is harmful to society. However, spending time
and resources on preventing accidental infringement is also harmful. Therefore,
maximizing the common good requires members of society to minimize the
aggregate harm (hereinafter “cost”) flowing from these two sources. This Section
explains each of these points in turn.

146. In particular, this Article departs from the “least cost-avoider” model. See infra note
157 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–11 (1966) (citing Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 326, 334–35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903) (describing Jefferson’s argument
that society ought only suffer the “embarrassment of an exclusive patent” if it “benefits
society”)).
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1. Accident Costs
Inventions are almost universally beneficial for society but, due to a public-goods
market failure, are likely to be underproduced in a competitive market.148 Patent
rights redress this issue by providing a time-limited monopoly right. During the
patent term, anyone who wishes to use the invention must negotiate a license with
the patent holder and pay the inventor a supracompetitive price. The ability to charge
a supracompetitive price enables the inventor to recover the fixed research and
development costs of the invention, and thus encourages inventors to supply
inventions at a more socially optimal rate.
Accidental infringement of patents hampers this goal. In accident cases, it is
impossible for the technology user to negotiate a license ex ante because, at that point
in time, it is not clear whether the technology is patented or who the patent holder is.
As a result, accidental infringement of patents occurs, resulting in the patentee’s
invention being used without the patentee receiving compensation. This lost revenue
represents a private cost to the patentee. More importantly, the lost revenue of the
patentee may reduce innovation incentives for future inventors, resulting in a social
cost to the wider public at a later time. For the time being, we shall assume that the
private cost the patentee suffers in lost license fees is a decent proxy for the lost
future social welfare resulting from decreased innovation incentives.
Let us call the private cost imposed on the patentee the accident costs or A, and
let us further assume that if the accident costs are $100. This will reduce incentives
for future innovation also by $100. Prior to the accident occurring, the technology
user cannot say with certainty what the accident costs will be, but she can roughly
calculate the expected accident costs, or pA, by multiplying the probability of an
accident occurring (p) by the amount of private harm (A) that such an accident would
cause if it were to occur.
2. Precaution Costs
The technology user can take steps to prevent such accidental infringement
occurring. Assuming the parties are operating in a country with a publicly accessible
register of all granted patents, someone engaging in a technical activity can search
the register to determine whether her activity would infringe a valid patent. Such
users can also inspect any relevant physical products to see whether they are labeled
with patent information (e.g., a patent number). Furthermore, users can keep up to
date with the patent portfolios of competitors and perform other searches (such as
simple Google searches). Let us call this user care, or Cu.
Equally, the patent holder can also take care to prevent such accidents. Most
importantly, the patent holder can mark any products she produces with the relevant
patent information149 (including products which are not themselves patented, but

148. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294–333 (2003) (describing the economic
theories behind patent law).
149. See, e.g., Claire Curran, A Simple Guide to Marking Your IP Rights, UDL INTELL.
PROP. (May 21, 2018), https://www.udl.co.uk/insights/a-simple-guide-to-marking-your-ip
-rights [https://perma.cc/B8U8-7E3L].
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which are produced by a patented method).150 This traditionally has required physical
marking of patented products, but since the America Invents Acts, the patentee’s
ability to provide notice through marking has substantially increased via the use of
“virtual marking” (i.e., affixing onto articles the word “patent” or “pat” followed by
a URL address directing the user to a website containing patented information).151
Likewise, patent holders can maintain websites providing “standardized information
about all intellectual property rights associated with [protected] products”152 and
update those websites as new IPRs are acquired. The patent holder can also write
clearer patent claims, thus increasing the chances that a user searching the registry
will find the relevant patent information. Or, as argued by Chiang, patent holders can
also search for users. In some markets where there are many patentees but only a few
users of the technology (e.g., the semiconductor industry where there are many
patentees but only a handful of producers), then it may be relatively easy for the
patentee to locate producers and initiate negotiations.153 In some cases, particularly
where unwary consumers may be involved, the patentee can effectively “spread the
word” (as George Selden did) about the hazards created by upstream unlawful uses
of their works.154 While it is certainly conceivable that, in some cases, the patentee
does not have any truly reasonable precautionary measures available to her, this is
not true of the majority of cases. In most cases, the probability of a patent accident
is determined not simply by the actions of the technology user, but also by the actions
of the patentee. Let us call this patentee care or C p.
It is often underappreciated that these measures are themselves costly; it costs the
technology user resources to search the register, and it costs the patentee resources
to appropriately mark products. Let us call this cost the prevention costs or B (i.e.,
the parties select a level of care, C, thus imposing a level of cost, B). Let us call the
technology user’s prevention costs Bu and the patentee’s prevention costs Bp.
3. Minimizing the Total Costs
If the user takes care, C, the probability of an accident goes down, and so too does
expected accident costs, pA. Thus, care has a positive effect on society’s welfare.
Simultaneously however, as the level of care rises, so too do the prevention costs, B.
As a result, taking more care, or trying to prevent all accidental infringements, is not

150. Christina Sharkey, Strategic Assertions: Evading the Patent Marking Requirement,
12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 103, 103 (2014).
151. See Gaetan de Rassenfosse, Notice Failure Revisited: Evidence on the Use of Virtual
Patent Marking, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24288, 2018),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24288.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD92-W2EZ]. See generally U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON VIRTUAL MARKING (2014) (discussing patent
marketing online). It is questionable whether the marking requirements currently provide
adequate incentives to innovators to mark. See Menell & Meurer, supra note 87, at 37 (“[B]oth
patent and copyright law have weakened marking requirements over the past several decades
as well as penalties for failure to provide accurate notice information.”).
152. Menell & Meurer, supra note 87, at 37. Menell and Meurer consider the possibility
of Congress mandating this precautionary measure from all companies.
153. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
154. See id.
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necessarily the best social outcome. In order to minimize the total cost society loses
on accidental infringement, the user must select a level of care that results in the least
overall cost, taking into account both the probable accident costs and the prevention
costs.155 As a rule of thumb, it is safe to say that in most cases taking some care will
help reduce total cost, but that beyond a point, taking more care becomes wasteful
and has a negative effect on society’s purse.
As an analogy, consider road traffic accidents. If motorists drive slower, that will
beneficially reduce the probability of accidents. But this reasoning would not justify
a complete ban on driving; clearly, if we were to ban driving completely society
would be worse off. As Guido Calabresi famously pointed out in 1970, if we were to
ban driving, the precautionary measure used to avoid the accidents would impose
more cost on society than simply allowing the accidents to occur.156 To put it bluntly,
we accept that some level of road traffic accidents will occur because it would be too
costly to prevent them from happening.
The same is true in patent law today. If technology users take some level of care
(e.g., by searching the patent register), that will often reduce the chances of an
accident occurring and help lower total accident costs. At a certain point, however,
the reverse is true and the costs of preventing the patent infringement outweigh the
benefit it produces. For example, it would obviously be negative for society if all
inventors were required to “down tools” and stop inventing whenever there was a
risk that such technical activity would infringe a patent. Therefore, our goal ought
not to be the complete eradication of patent accidents altogether. Instead, the optimal
situation is for users to adopt a reasonable (i.e., cost-justified) level of care. More
formally, the user ought to take care up to the point that when the marginal cost of
such care equals the marginal benefit represented by the reduction in expected
accident cost; the user ought not to go beyond that point.

155. Arguably, the cost of patent accidents involves an additional cost (i.e., the cost of
duplicative R&D efforts). The social cost of the patent accident is not merely the cost to the
patentee and the subsequent depression of innovation incentives, but also includes the
resources society spends on recreating a technology which already exists. See generally
WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 302–10 (2003) (characterizing the rules that reduce the social costs of patent
protection). However, for a number of reasons, this Article brackets this potential cost. It is
not clear whether the majority of accidental infringement cases involve any significant
duplication costs. For example, of the Schmeiser case, supra text accompanying note 72, the
Innovatio cases, supra text accompanying note 45, or the Rambus case, supra text
accompanying note 50, none involved any wasteful duplication efforts on behalf of the
technology user. Furthermore, when some duplication is involved, such as in NTP, the secondcomer’s R&D can equally lead to benefits in terms of slightly differentiated products with the
capacity to better supply consumer demand. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Intellectual
Property and the Economics of Product Differentiation, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Ben Depoorter & Peter Menell eds., 2018). As
a result, it is difficult to say to what extent duplicative efforts exist and impose cost on the
patent system, and how these costs factor into the basic analysis is left to another day.
156. See CALABRESI, supra note 25, at 17–20.
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Table 1 illustrates this principle. Consider a hypothetical situation in which only
the technology user can take care to prevent the patent accident occurring. For
example, the technology user has invented a new type of mousetrap and is
considering whether to commercially sell this product, but she is concerned that the
mousetrap may already be patented. If she does not compensate the patentee for the
use of the mousetrap, the patentee will suffer a private cost of $100. At this point,
she has three options: (1) she could not search the patent register, (2) she could spend
one hour searching the register, or (3) she could spend two hours searching the
register. The probability of accident plus the costs associated with the level of care
are depicted in the table.
Table 1: User Care

0 Hour
Search
1 Hour
Search
2 Hour
Search

Cost of Care

Probability of
Accident

Expected
Accident Loss

Total Social
Cost

0

15%

15

15

3

10%

10

13

6

8%

8

14

In this scenario, the total social cost is minimized if the user spends one hour
searching the register for the patentee. Spending one hour searching is cost justified
because, while it imposes a marginal cost of three dollars, it produces a marginal
benefit of five dollars (i.e., the expected accident costs reduce by five dollars).
However, spending a second hour searching is not cost-justified. A second hour
searching imposes a marginal cost of three dollars but only produces a marginal
benefit of two dollars. Thus, social cost is minimized if, and only if, the user takes
cost-justified care.
In most real-world situations, both the technology user and the patentee can take
some cost-justified precautions to avoid the accident. Minimizing the total social cost
of patent accidents not only often requires the technology user to perform a patent
register search but also requires the patent holder to provide appropriate notice of the
patent rights by drafting clear claims, by marking the product in an accessible
manner, and by searching for technology users. Table 2 illustrates this intuition.
Consider, once again, the technology user that is considering whether to sell her
mousetrap and has the option to spend between zero and two hours searching the
patent register. Further, imagine that the patentee also has the ability to take care at
the same cost: the patentee also can spend between zero and two hours searching for
potential users of her patented mousetrap. These “care options” are laid out below.
In a case such as this, the optimal situation is option e: both parties take one hour
of care. As in the previous table, the cost-justified level of precaution for the user is
to select one hour of care. Any less care (options a-c) or any more care (options g-i)
would result in higher social cost. Likewise, it is also cost justified for the patentee
to spend one hour searching: the marginal benefit of four dollars in reduced expected
accident costs exceeds the marginal cost it imposes of three dollars. However,
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spending the second hour searching is not cost justified because the marginal cost it
imposes outweighs the reduction in expected accident costs.
Table 2: User Care and Patentee Care
User
Care
(Hours
Search)

Patentee
Care
(Hours
Search)

User
Care
Cost

Patentee
Care
Cost

Probability
of Accident

Expected
Accident
Costs

Total
Social
Cost

a.

0

0

0

0

15%

15

15

b.

0

1

0

3

11%

11

14

c.

0

2

0

6

10%

10

16

d.

1

0

3

0

10%

10

13

e.

1

1

3

3

6%

6

12

f.

1

2

3

6

5%

5

14

g.

2

0

6

0

8%

8

14

h.

2

1

6

3

5%

5

14

i.

2

2

6

6

5%

5

17

The table illustrates another important principle: minimizing the total social cost
of patent accidents cannot be achieved by simply identifying the “least cost
avoider.”157 Sometimes the argument is made that, generally, the user can take more

157. Commonly, a least cost-avoider (LCA) model is used to allocate responsibility in
unilateral rather than bilateral accidents. In patent law, accidents are bilateral because both
parties can affect the probability of an accident. But what if only one party can take efficient
precautionary measures? Or alternatively, what if both parties can take care, but because their
care would be largely duplicative, it is better if only one party take care? In these cases, law
and economics literature often recommends identifying the party which could avoid the
accident at the least cost and allocate the responsibility wholly to that party. See SHAVELL,
supra note 36, at 18 (“[B]oth injurers and victims generally ought to do something to avoid
risk; the effect of liability rules is therefore different from that in the least-cost avoider
model.”).
This version of the LCA analysis ought not to be confused with the analysis provided by
Chiang, supra note 12. Chiang argues that patent law ought to place the burden on the party
that can avoid the accident at the least cost. However, Chiang’s analysis is more sophisticated
than most common versions of the LCA discussed in patent law. Chiang’s analysis is a
marginal analysis. That is, the law will impose the responsibility on the LCA but will do so
ex post. Parties will not know until litigation who is the LCA. The court will then compare the
parties’ relative search costs and determine the LCA. Since the parties will not know in
advance which party is the LCA, both parties will be incentivized to conduct reasonable cost-
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effective measures to prevent the accident than the patentee, and, therefore, the
responsibility should wholly fall on that user to avoid the accident.158 But while often
true, this criticism is beside the point. Even if the user has generally more effective
measures than the patentee, the patentee may still have some cost-justified
precautionary measures which, if taken, would further reduce the accident costs. The
goal should be to encourage all parties who can take non-duplicative, cost-effective
care to do so, rather than simply set incentives for one party.
The table demonstrates this claim. In the scenario, the user has the more effective
precautionary measures: in option d, the user takes one hour of care reducing the
probability of the accident by five percent, whereas in option b, the patentee takes
one hour of care thus reducing the accident probability by four percent. Therefore, if
the choice is to make either the user or the patentee take one hour of care, then
making the user take care is preferable because it results in less cost (i.e., thirteen
dollars instead of fourteen dollars). However, these two options are both less
preferable to the optimal situation, option e, wherein both parties take one hour of
care: this option reduces cost to twelve dollars. This situation occurs because user
care and patentee care often have a synergetic effect: the effect of the precautionary
measures are not simply cumulative but have an effect greater than the sum of their
parts.
Now that we understand our goal, the question becomes: what liability rule ought
we impose to achieve this outcome? Subsequent to Calabresi, legal economists have
analyzed when, and in what circumstances, different liability rules help minimize

justified searches ahead of time. For example, a patentee, perceiving the possibility that she
will be held to be the LCA and thus potentially contributorily negligent for failing to perform
a reasonable search, will be incentivized to adopt reasonable precautionary measures. As a
result, Chiang’s analysis aims to set incentives for bilateral care just as the analysis in this
Article.
Nevertheless, some questions linger about the marginal LCA analysis. Most importantly, I
find the analysis somewhat convoluted. Standard accounts of accidents typically split
accidents into unilateral and bilateral accidents; in the former, economists suggest that the law
should allocate the responsibility for avoiding the accident to the LCA, whereas in the latter,
economists suggest the law should allocate the responsibility using a negligence rule. See
SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 18. I worry that transporting the LCA concept into the bilateral
accident arena makes matters more confusing than they need to be and, accordingly, invites
misunderstandings. Id. (“The model of the least-cost avoider may be misleading for thinking
about the class of bilateral accidents examined in this book.”). Chiang clearly tries to prevent
those misunderstandings in the article, but the nuances of this analysis may very well be missed
by even reasonably alert readers. Secondly, I am not entirely convinced that if a court were to
determine the LCA ex post, this would always lead to adequate incentives for bilateral care ex
ante. For example, imagine the user finds a product that she suspects is patented but lacks
patent marking. The user may accurately predict that a court in such circumstances would hold
the patentee to be the LCA on the grounds of inadequate patent marking. The user may still
be able to take some reasonable measures in this case, such as performing a search of the
registry. However, knowing in advance the likelihood that the patentee would be deemed the
LCA, I have doubts that the user would still adopt these reasonable measures.
158. See Chiang, supra note 12, at 10–14 (summarizing versions of this view).
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accident costs (most notably, Shavell,159 Landes and Posner,160 and Cooter and
Ulen161). The following sections apply the analytical frameworks and insights
developed in this literature to the particular problem of minimizing the cost of patent
accidents.
B. Liability Rules Compared: Primary Considerations
Having demonstrated that efficient use of resources requires the patentee and the
user to take cost-justified preventative measures, the question we must answer next
is: which liability rule will encourage the parties to take such care? This Section
compares various liability rules in relation to this goal. The following Section
introduces some further variables (or “secondary considerations”) into the analysis.
1. No Liability
Under a no liability rule, the user is not liable for the accidents she causes.
Therefore, the accident costs remain with the patentee. Thus, the patentee pays for
the costs of her precaution and the expected accident costs (i.e., Bp + pA). Meanwhile,
the user only pays the costs of her precautions (Bu). Both patentee and user are
assumed to be rational actors who will select a level of care (C) to minimize their
own private cost.
Using our mousetrap example from earlier, Table 3 demonstrates the private costs
that the parties would bear under various different liability rules. The care options in
Table 3 mimic those found in Table 2. From this table, we can see that under a no
liability rule, the parties will not select the optimal levels of care (i.e., option e).
While the patentee will take the appropriate care, the technology user will not.162 As
the technology user is still liable for willful infringement, the patentee’s best
financial strategy is to alert the user to the patent, thus improving the chances of a
licensing deal. On the other hand, in order to minimize her private costs, the
technology user will select to spend zero hours searching (i.e., options a through c).
From these options, the patentee will select to spend one hour searching because this
minimizes her private expenditure (i.e., she spends fourteen dollars rather than fifteen
or sixteen dollars). Therefore, the equilibrium is that the parties will select option b
and total social cost will be higher than optimal (e).

159. See SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 18.
160. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 33.
161. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (2016).
162. This is, of course, a highly stylized analysis. In reality, a range of other doctrinal
mechanisms (see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (describing the definiteness requirement)) and
practical realities encourage some patentee care. However, the preceding discussion reveals
that these instruments alone lead to suboptimal incentives as evidenced by the high rate of
accidental infringement. Therefore, this analysis strips those considerations away to first
establish what liability rule is appropriate, and then later in Part IV analyzes some of the
doctrines already in place to encourage such care.
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2. Strict Liability
Under a strict liability rule, the user must pay the patentee compensatory damages,
or a liability award, L, which is equal to the accident costs. Therefore, the patentee
only bears the cost of her own precaution (Bp), while the technology user pays the
costs of her precaution and the expected liability award (i.e., Bu + pL). Once again,
both parties select a level of care that will minimize these costs. The parties’ private
costs associated with this liability rule are found above in Table 3.
This rule will, once again, result in sub-optimal behavior. The patentee will
minimize her costs by selecting a zero-hour search (i.e., options a, d, or g).
Meanwhile, the defendant will select to perform a one-hour search because this
minimizes her cost (she pays thirteen dollars rather than fourteen or fifteen dollars).
The resulting equilibrium is option d and total social cost is higher than optimal.

Table 3: Private Cost Under Liability Rules

No Liability

Strict Liability

Simple Neg.

Strict Liability +
Contributory Neg.
Neg. + Contributory
Neg.

Comparative Neg.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

P. cost

15

14

16

10

9

11

8

8

11

U. cost

0

0

0

3

3

3

6

6

6

P. cost

0

3

6

0

3

6

0

3

6

U. cost

15

11

10

13

9

8

14

11

11

P. cost

0

3

6

10

9

11

8

8

11

U. cost

15

11

10

3

3

3

6

6

6

P. cost

15

3

6

10

3

6

8

3

6

U. cost

0

11

10

3

9

8

6

11

11

P. cost

15

3

6

10

9

11

8

8

11

U. cost

0

11

10

3

3

3

6

6

6

P. cost

7.5

3

6

10

9

11

8

8

11

U. cost

7.5

11

10

3

3

3

6

6

6
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3. Negligence
In contrast to strict liability and no liability, this Section demonstrates that a
negligence rule would encourage cost-justified care from both parties. A liability rule
is a categorized as a negligence rule if the decision to impose liability is conditional
upon one or more party’s level of preventative care falling below an acceptable
level.163 There are multiple different forms such a negligence rule could take, simple
negligence, strict liability plus a contributory negligence defense, negligence plus a
contributory negligence defense, or comparative negligence. Each one provides
incentives for bilateral cost-justified care.164
Under a simple negligence rule, the technology user pays compensatory damages
if she fails to take all reasonable care.165 Care is considered “reasonable” if it is cost
justified (this is the famous Learned Hand Formula in which care is considered
reasonable if the marginal benefit it produces is greater than the marginal cost it
imposes).166 Therefore, if a technology user fails to take all reasonable care, she will
pay a liability award plus any care she does take (i.e., Bu + pL); meanwhile, the
patentee in this situation will only pay for her own precaution costs (i.e., Bp).
Alternatively, if a technology user does take all reasonable care, she will only pay
for the cost of her care (i.e., Bu); meanwhile, the patentee will pay for her care and
any remaining expected accident costs (i.e., Bp + pA). The private costs the parties
face under a negligence rule are presented above in Table 3. Under this rule, a
technology user will minimize her costs by selecting a one-hour search. Taking any
care below this level exposes her to liability, while taking care above this level
imposes extra prevention costs. Therefore, the technology user will select option d,
e, or f. From these options, the patentee minimizes her costs by selecting one hour of
care. The equilibrium is that both parties take the appropriate level of care and social
cost is minimized.
Under a strict liability rule with a contributory negligence defense, the user is
liable for all accidents she causes, unless the patentee is contributorily negligent.167
If the patentee is contributorily negligent, the user is not liable. A defendant is
contributorily negligent if she failed to take all reasonable care to prevent the
accident. Once again, reasonableness is equated with cost-justified precaution.
Therefore, if the patentee takes reasonable care, then the patentee pays for her own
care costs (Bp), while the technology user pays for her own care costs and expected
liability (Bu + pL). If the patentee fails to take reasonable care, then the patentee pays
for her own care plus any expected accident costs (Bp + pA), while the user pays for
her care costs only (Bu). Table 3 lists the private costs the parties face under this rule.
Under this rule, the patentee will select to perform one-hour search (i.e., options b,
e, or h) as this minimizes her costs (i.e., three dollars). From these options, the user
will select option e as this minimizes her costs. The result is the parties select option
e and total costs are minimized.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 161, at 189–228.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 205–08.
Id. at 208–11.
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Under a negligence rule with a contributory negligence defense, the user is liable
for accidents caused by her negligence, unless the patentee was also negligent. Once
again, negligence is defined as failure to take reasonable care according to the
Learned Hand Formula.168 Under this rule, the following options emerge: (1) if the
user takes reasonable care, she bears the cost of her own precaution only (Bu);
meanwhile the patentee bears the cost of her own precaution plus any remaining
expected accident costs (Bp + pA); (2) if the user fails to take reasonable care, and
the patentee takes reasonable care, then bears the cost of her own precaution and any
expected liability costs (Bu + pL); meanwhile, the patentee pays for her own
precaution costs (Bp); if the user fails to take reasonable care, and the patentee also
fails to take reasonable care, then the user bears only her own precaution costs (Bu);
meanwhile the patentee pays for her own precaution costs and any remaining
expected accident costs (Bp + pA). Table 3 demonstrates the private costs associated
with each liability rule. Under this rule, the patentee has an incentive to take costjustified precaution. By searching for one hour, the patentee can minimize her own
private costs (any less than this exposes her to the possibility of being held
contributorily negligent and paying for the expected accident costs; any more than
this unnecessarily increases her precaution costs). If the patentee can be expected to
search for one hour, then the options for the technology user are options b, e, and h.
To minimize her private costs, she will select option e (any less exposes her to
liability, any more than that is unnecessary to avoid liability). Once again, the optimal
choice is reached.
Lastly, under a comparative negligence rule, the user is not liable when she takes
due care. If she fails to take due care, then she will be liable. However, if she fails to
take due care, and the patentee also fails to take due care, then the court will apportion
the accident costs between the two parties according to their level of fault.169
Therefore, the following options emerge: (1) if the user takes reasonable care, she
bears the cost of her own precaution only (Bu); meanwhile the patentee bears the cost
of her own precaution plus any remaining expected accident costs (i.e., Bp + pA); (2)
if the user fails to take reasonable care, and the patentee takes reasonable care, then
the user bears the cost of her own precaution and any expected liability costs (Bu +
pL); meanwhile, the patentee pays for her own precaution costs (Bp); (3) if the user
fails to take reasonable care, and the patentee also fails to take reasonable care, then
the user bears her own precaution costs and a portion (assumed here to be half) of
the accident costs in liability (Bu + pL/2); meanwhile, the patentee pays for her own
precaution costs and any remaining expected accident costs (Bp + pA/2). Table 3
demonstrates the private costs associated with each liability rule. Under this rule, the
technology user minimizes her own costs by taking one hour of care (options d-f).
Thereafter, the patentee minimizes her costs by selecting one hour of care. The
equilibrium is option e, and total cost is minimized.

168. Id. This is distinct from the type of “contributory negligence” rule used in other
common law systems, particularly the U.K. where “contributory negligence” refers to a
reduction in damages proportional to the defendant’s fault. See Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence) Act 1945 §1 (UK).
169. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 161, at 208–11.
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C. Liability Rules Compared: Secondary Considerations
Thus far, the analysis has demonstrated that all versions of a negligence rule are
preferable to a strict liability rule or no liability. Because negligence rules encourage
both technology user and patentee to take cost-justified precautions, such rules help
minimize total social cost. By selecting a level of care that conforms to the standard
of reasonable care as defined by the Hand Formula, each party has the ability to shift
the accident costs onto the other party, thus minimizing their own private costs. This
Section introduces further considerations that complicate the analysis, but that also
help us select which version of a negligence rule is preferable. Those secondary
considerations are, activity levels, administrate costs, error costs, and externalities.
1. Activity Levels
Taking more precaution is not the only way the parties can reduce the chances of
an accident occurring. The other option is for the parties to change their activity
levels.170 For example, in road traffic accident cases, drivers could reduce the
possibility of an accident by not speaking on their cell phones while driving, but they
could also reduce the probability of an accident simply by driving less. Likewise, in
patent law, the technology user could reduce the probability of a patent accident by
engaging in technical activities less often, and the patentee could also reduce the
probability of an accident by reducing her level of innovation. However, the parties
engage in these activities because doing so brings them utility. Therefore, while
engaging in the activity less reduces the chances of harmful accidents, it also reduces
the utility the parties receive. Table 4 illustrates this relationship.
Table 4: Activity Levels
User
Activity

User
Utility

User
Care
Cost

Ptee
Activity

Ptee
Utility

Ptee
Care
Cost

Total
Accident
Losses

Total
Social
Welfare

1

1

40

3

1

40

3

20

54

2

2

60

6

2

60

6

40

68

3

3

69

9

3

69

9

60

60

4

4

75

12

4

75

12

80

42

5

5

70

15

5

70

15

100

10

Table 4 assumes that both the user and the patentee are now considering how
much time to spend on the activity that may create patent accidents (i.e., innovation).
Each party acts to maximize her own private utility. Total social welfare is calculated
by adding the user utility and the patentee utility and subtracting the user care costs,
the patentee care costs, and the total accident costs. Option 2—both parties engage

170. Id. at 210–12.
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in the activity two times—is optimal as this maximizes social welfare. Table 5
depicts the utility each party would receive under various different liability rules.
Table 5: Activity Levels Under Liability Rules

No Liability

Strict Liability

Simple
Negligence

Strict Liability +
Contributory
Negligence

User
Utility

Ptee
Utility

User
Utility

Ptee
Utility

User
Utility

Ptee
Utility

User
Utility

Ptee
Utility

1

40

17

17

40

37

17

17

37

2

60

14

14

60

54

14

14

54

3

69

0

0

69

60

0

0

60

4

75

-21

-17

71

63

-21

-21

63

5

70

-45

-45

70

55

-45

-45

55

Under no liability, the user will engage in too much technical activity (in addition
to not taking sufficient care), whereas the patentee will engage in the optimal amount
of technical activity.171 The user maximizes her utility by simply selecting an option
which yields the highest utility (i.e., option 4). Meanwhile, the patentee bears the
cost of any care she takes and the expected accident costs. To maximize utility, the
patentee sets an activity level that yields the highest utility minus the cost of care and
the expected accident costs (i.e., option 2). Meanwhile, a strict liability rule yields
the opposite conclusion. The user sets an activity level that maximizes her utility
minus the cost of care and the expected accident costs (i.e., option 2), while the
patentee selects an activity level that yields simply the highest utility (i.e., option 4).
More important, however, is the difference between the activity levels under a
simple negligence rule and a strict liability rule with a contributory negligence
defense. Under the simple negligence rule, the user will select an activity level that
maximizes her utility minus the cost of care (i.e., option 4); the patentee, meanwhile,
selects an activity level that maximizes her utility minus the cost of care and any
remaining accident costs (i.e., option 2).172 Therefore, the user engages in the activity
too frequently, but the patentee does so at the optimal level. This is because the
patentee is the residual bearer of the harm.173 Under a negligence rule, as
demonstrated earlier, both parties will take cost-justified precautions. Nevertheless,
there is still an expected accident cost when both take such precautions. The question
is: who bears this cost? In negligence, it is the patentee who bears this cost: as the
user takes due care, she is not liable, and the expected costs remain with the patentee.

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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Under a strict liability rule with contributory negligence, the opposite result is
achieved because now the user and not the patentee is the residual bearer of the harm.
Under this rule, the patentee will set her activity level that maximizes utility minus
the cost of care. Meanwhile, the user will set an activity level that maximizes her
utility minus the cost of care and the expected accident costs.174 As a result, the user
will engage in the activity at the optimal level, but the patentee will not. Likewise,
under a negligence rule with contributory negligence, the patentee is the residual
bearer of harm and will take the appropriate activity level, but the user will not. The
same is true for comparative negligence.
What this demonstrates is that no liability rule yields incentives for both bilateral
care and optimal bilateral activity levels. Any form of negligence rule will result in
only one party internalizing the benefit of adopting an appropriate activity level, and
as a result, the other party will engage in the activity at too great an extent. The only
theoretical exception to this would be if judges take activity levels into account when
defining reasonable care under the Hand Formula. However, it is generally agreed
that judges do not have the institutional ability to determine how much of an activity
a private party ought to engage in (e.g., how many miles someone ought to drive their
car).
The normal response to this by economists of tort law is to make the party whose
activity is more likely to yield accidents the residual bearer of the harm.175 For
example, accidents involving motorists and cyclists involve bilateral care: cars can
drive slower and with more observations, cyclists can wear appropriate colors and
lights; it is optimal for both parties to take some level of care. However, the party
who has the most control over the accident is likely the motorist—no amount of
brightly colored vests will prevent the accident if the motorist drives with very little
awareness of her surroundings. Ideally therefore, a contributory negligence rule
ought to be adopted. In which case, both motorists and cyclists will take an optimal
care level, and, because the motorist is the residual bearer of the harm, the motorist
will select the appropriate activity level; the cyclist will not take the appropriate
activity level and spend too much time cycling, but this is less dangerous than
motorists spending extra hours on the road.
What does this mean for patent accidents? The answer is: surprisingly little!
Having already established in Section B that it is preferable to adopt some form of
negligence rule to ensure bilateral care, the pressing question is: which version of the
negligence rule is preferable? However, we see that whatever version we choose will
result in one party selecting an activity level that is higher than optimal. If a simple
negligence rule is adopted, the user will engage in too much technical activity
because she is not the residual bearer of harm (and the same for negligence plus
contributory negligence or comparative negligence); whereas if a strict liability rule
with a contributory negligence defense is adopted, the patentee will engage in too
much technical activity. Therefore, we need to pick between the lesser of two evils:
too much activity from the patentee or from the user.
The problem this presents is twofold. First, I am unconvinced that controlling the
level of activity—innovation—is, as a practical matter, likely to improve social

174. Id.
175. Id.
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welfare. Innovations come with very significant positive externalities (or
“spillovers”). New innovations spur future innovations in unpredictable and often
very significant ways, and much of this value is not captured by the patentee.176
While the law of diminishing marginal utility makes it clear that at some point
investing in further innovation must become socially excessive, it seems unlikely that
we are at such a point today. As a practical concern, the level of compound growth
created by innovation suggests that the positive externalities associated with greater
innovation will nearly always be greater than the social loss flowing from increased
accident costs.177 Thus the “optimal” activity level seems of minor significance.
However, put this concern to one side and assume that there is an optimal level of
innovation that the parties ought to be engaging in from a welfare point. Even if we
assume this, it is not clear that either party’s activities are more important to control
in order to better reach the social optimal. To decrease the expected accident costs,
is it more important for the user to engage in less innovation, or is it more important
for the patentee to engage in less innovation and to patent less frequently? I do not
see a clear answer to this question. It seems initially that both parties’ activities have
an equal effect on the probability of an accident occurring. While there certainly may
be individual cases in which one party’s activities may contribute more greatly to the
chances of an accident, it is hard to say with any confidence whether, globally, across
the whole range of patent infringement, controlling the patentee’s or user’s activities
is comparatively more important.178
Therefore, the importance of activity levels ought to be largely bracketed when
asking which is the optimal liability rule. To determine which is the best form of
liability rule, we will need to spend more time focusing on the following criteria:
administrative cost, error cost, and externalities.
2. Administrative Cost
Whatever rule is selected, actors in the legal system will need to apply the rule to
real world cases. Different liability rules lead to greater or lesser amounts of such
administrative costs.179 The cost of application depends on a number of factors, the
most important of which are the complexity of the rules, and the number of cases
requiring resolution.
Strict liability is a relatively straight forward rule to apply, but it also leads to a
high number of infringement cases.180 The rule is straightforward in application
because, unlike in negligence, the court is not required to conduct a complex factual

176. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257,
259 (2007).
177. ROBERT COOTER, THE FALCON’S GYRE: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
INNOVATION AND GROWTH (2014) (arguing that “[i]nnovation causes compound growth that
swamps static inefficiency like a tsunami swamps a scow”).
178. This conclusion seems to stand even if the technology user is merely a non-innovative
manufacturer/distributor. Society would not seem particularly well served by trying to control
the number of products that are made and distributed any more than it would be by limiting
the amount of innovation.
179. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 161, at 223–25.
180. Id.
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inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant’s behavior.181 However, this initial
cost saving is diminished because the strict liability rule results in more cases of
infringement. Under a strict liability rule, nearly all cases of infringement will require
some form of resolution. At its most costly, that resolution will take the form of
litigation and adjudication. But even cases which do not involve litigation will
produce additional costs. In all cases of infringement, the patentee will attempt to
shift the cost to the technology user, and this will involve procedure and associated
costs. In the absence of litigation, that cost will come through alternative dispute
resolution, inter-party negotiation, damage calculations, and transferring monetary
compensation. By contrast, a negligence rule has the benefit of removing a subset of
infringement cases and eliminating their associated resolution costs. Thus, a
negligence rule has the benefit of reducing the amount of case resolution, although
each case of infringement involves increased complexity.182
Which would involve less administrative costs overall? It is difficult to say with
confidence. The question depends on whether more frequent litigation, or more
complex litigation, is a more significant contributor to the cost of the patent system.
When comparing liability rules generally, strict liability is typically seen as the least
administratively costly rule. On the other hand, existing empirical evidence suggests
that the administrative costs of patent liability are currently very high, and this may
be in part due to the current strict liability rule. Bessen and Meurer’s empirical
analysis of the U.S. patent system found that patent litigation costs have “exploded”
over past decades.183 The cost of patent litigation annually for firms (excluding
chemical and pharmaceutical firms) increased six-fold from 1984 to 1999 (from less
than $184 billion to $1,104 billion).184 What is driving this explosion? The authors
conclude that the “increase in aggregate litigation cost is mainly driven by the
increasing frequency of litigation, which has roughly tripled since the 1980s.”185
Litigation cost is exploding, not only because trials are becoming more complex and
time consuming,186 but primarily because the volume of litigation is increasing.
While ultimately, we do not have sufficient empirical evidence to fully determine the

181. Furthermore, the rule is easier to apply for individual parties. Currently, under strict
liability, patentees do not need to assess the technology user’s level of care prior to deciding
to take action or not, whereas they would under a negligence rule. Under a negligence rule,
not only would courts in litigation need to spend more resources on examining the defendant’s
care, patentees would spend more resources on discovery and exploratory litigation to
determine the defendant’s level of care.
182. While negligence can increase the complexity of cases, it also has the potential to
limit their complexity. In a subset of cases, it will be relatively easy for a court or fact finder
to determine whether the defendant behaved negligently. In such cases, the decision maker
can potentially determine the outcome of the case by examining the negligence issue only,
without making a ruling on typically complicated matters such as claim construction.
183. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 16.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Although, that indeed is happening due to the increasing complexities of claim
construction. See generally Dan L. Burke & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts?
Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009); Tun-Jen Chiang &
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE
L.J. 530, 572–92 (2013).
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administrative costs of each liability rule, we can certainly say that a strict liability
regime is not conclusively less administratively costly than a negligence liability
rule.187
Finally, it is worth noting that, to the extent that a negligence rule is more
complicated to apply, this cost is mitigated by the doctrine of stare decisis. Over time,
courts, applying a negligence standard, will develop categories and clearer proxy
rules for identifying negligence. This will aid in reducing the cost of applying the
reasonableness test in future cases.
3. Error Cost
Courts are likely to make errors when applying the liability rule. In particular,
courts may make errors when calculating the level of damages, or courts may make
errors in defining the reasonable care standard.188 Both of these errors, if made
consistently, could lead to the parties adopting sub-optimal levels of care.
A strict liability rule is highly prone to erroneous damage calculations. As
demonstrated above in Table 3, a strict liability rule will incentivize the technology
user to adopt an appropriate level of care. However, this assumes the liability award,
L, is set equal to the accident costs. If the liability award is greater or less than the
accident cost, A, then the user will take more or less than the optimal care level.
Currently, under a strict liability rule, it is assumed that the patentee will take no care,
and the user has a choice of taking zero hours of care, one hour of care, or two hours
of care. One hour of care is optimal, and because this option lowers the user’s costs
(this option costs her fourteen dollars whereas option a costs sixteen dollars and
option g costs fifteen dollars), she will take this care. However, if the court
erroneously calculates the damages and the liability award is double the actual
damages, then the user has a choice of taking zero hours of care (for thirty dollars),
one hour of care (for twenty-five dollars), or two hours of care (for twenty-four
dollars). In this scenario, the user will take greater than optimal care because the
liability award is much higher than the compensatory level. Therefore, while errors
in judging reasonable care are impossible when applying a strict liability rule, errors
in calculating damages are a significant challenge to setting the appropriate
incentives for care.
A simple negligence rule is the mirror image of a strict liability rule: while courts
will make errors in applying the standard of care, errors in calculating damages are

187. One potential counter-argument is that the increased uncertainty of a negligence rule
will increase the amount of litigation, following the Priest-Klein hypothesis that win rates for
plaintiffs tend towards fifty percent in cases where litigants have symmetric stakes, see George
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4
(1984). However, to the extent that this is true, the effect must be balanced against the counterveiling effect that the scope of infringement is decreased under negligence, that negligence
sets better incentives for accident precaution, and that in many cases defendants will know in
advance whether they have successfully adopted reasonable care, thus limiting the uncertainty
of the rule. When appreciated globally, it seems more likely that infringement cases will
decrease under negligence. However, the margin of such decrease will likely be smaller given
the small potential for increased litigation flowing from uncertainty in the negligence rule.
188. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 161, at 217–20.
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far less significant than in strict liability.189 Errors in applying the standard of care
are highly significant. If the court sets the standard too high, technology users will
over-invest in care. For example, in Table 3, imagine the court miscalculates the cost
of the technology user’s patent search, and believes the cost of the second hour of
searching is only one dollar (not three dollars). Under the Hand Formula, a court
would find that a reasonable person would take this extra hour searching (because
now the marginal benefit of two dollars in expected accident cost saved is greater
than its marginal cost of one dollar).190 As a result, the user would have an incentive
to conform to that higher standard, and take two hours of care, to avoid a liability
award, even though doing so deviates from the optimal care level. Likewise, if courts
routinely set the standard of care too low, defendants will frequently under-invest in
care.191
On the other hand, the incentives for care set by a negligence rule are far less
susceptible to distortions created by erroneous damage calculations, so long as the
standard of care is optimally set. If the standard of care is set at the correct level, the
defendant has an incentive to conform to that standard, and thus avoid a liability
award, regardless of the level of damages. For example, consider the case just
introduced in which the court sets the liability award at double the accident costs.
But now, consider the case under a negligence rule in which the court accurately sets
the standard of care. In this case, if the user adopts zero hours of care, her expected
liability is thirty dollars. But if she takes one hour of care, she is not liable and only
pays her cost of care (i.e., three dollars). If she adopts two hours of care, she is once
again not liable and pays only the cost of care (i.e., six dollars). Thus, if the standard
of care is set correctly, errors in damage calculations are insignificant, because the
parties have the incentive to conform to the cost-justified care required by the
negligence rule.192

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. A related point is that a negligence defense rule may open the door to opportunistic
behavior. Defendants who know of the patent may nevertheless document efforts at reasonable
accident precaution in the hope that the paper trail may hide their intentional infringement.
However, this would be a risky strategy for a defendant to adopt. In such cases, their
infringement is willful. If the willfulness is discovered, they will face enhanced damages. The
risk of hiding their intentional infringement in this manner would need to be weighed against
the risk of enhanced damages. See generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages,
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1427 (2018).
192. Theoretically, it is possible for too low damages to result in distortions even under a
negligence regime. It is not impossible, for example, for a technology user to prefer to select
pay incorrectly low damages rather than invest in cost-justified precautionary measures. See
Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 136 (2011) (assuming when the
standard of care is optimal, injurers will be under deterred with too-low damages but will be
optimally deterred with efficient and too-high damages). However, this problem would seem
to occur infrequently in patent law. The miscalculation of damages would need to be very
significant to result in a case where the technology user would prefer to select damages rather
than take precaution. For example, take the case where the expected accident (pA) costs are
$110,000, and the defendant can take care for a cost of $10,000 which will reduce the expected
accident costs by ten percent. In such a case, care is efficient as $10,000 in care will result in
a $11,000 reduction in expected harm. Therefore, under a negligence rule, the defendant’s
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Unfortunately, strict liability plus contributory negligence is the worst of both
worlds. As the technology user is subject to strict liability, her incentives are highly
affected by miscalculations in calculating damages. In the example just discussed,
distortions would likely occur in user care under such a liability rule. The patentee
avoids liability only by conforming to the reasonable care standard. As a result, the
user assumes the patentee takes such care, and that she will be held strictly liable.
Thus, her options are to take zero hours of care (for thirty dollars), one hour of care
(for twenty-five dollars), or two hours of care (for twenty-four dollars). She will
minimize her costs by taking two hours of care, even though this is higher than
optimal. Meanwhile, if the standard of reasonable care is set incorrectly in the
contributory negligence analysis, then the patentee will have an incentive to conform
to that suboptimal standard. Thus, as compared to strict liability and negligence
liability, strict liability plus contributory negligence yields both types of error cost.
A negligence rule with a contributory negligence defense and a comparative
negligence rule are also problematic. Compared to a simple negligence rule, which
would distort the incentives for the technology user only, errors in setting the
negligence standard under these rules would distort the incentives bilaterally.
4. Externalities
Until now, the analysis has assumed that the private harm suffered by the patent
owner is a perfect proxy for the public harm suffered when an accidental
infringement occurs. However, frequently this is not the case. Often, inventions come
with significant positive externalities (or spillovers) which cannot be captured by the
patent monopoly.193 For example, imagine in our scenario in Table 2, the patent at
issue is a drug which alleviates the symptoms of the common cold. The patent
enables the inventor to charge producers of the drug $100. However, frequent use of
the medicine by people in society may have the further benefit of reducing the spread
of the cold virus (due to less frequent coughing and sneezing). Thus, the value to
society that accompanies the production of the drug may be higher than the patentee’s
private value (e.g., $200). In order for society to minimize the cost of accidents, the
user must take cost-justified care, taking into account the cost of the precautions and
the expected accident costs. But the expected accident costs must reflect the social
loss that would accompany the patent accident, not merely the private loss caused to
the patentee.
Similarly, we have so far assumed that the utility the user receives from
production of her product is a perfect proxy for the public good associated with the
user’s technical activity. Once again, this is not necessarily the case. The technical
activity of the user may provide significant positive externalities beyond that
captured in the user’s private utility. For example, if the invention is a wireless
network technology, a user may create a type of cell phone employing wireless emails. The user’s product may be a commercial success, yielding private utility for

choice is to either take care for $10,000 or expect to pay $110,000 in liability. If the court
incorrectly sets the liability award at, e.g., $100,000, or $75,000, or $50,000, the same result
will occur. Only if the damages are set very significantly too low (i.e., below $10,000 will the
technology user’s incentives be distorted).
193. See Frischman & Lemley, supra note 176.
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herself, but widespread use of this product may have even greater social benefits,
because the new product enables faster communication between people in society
leading to better information transfer. When seeking to minimize the social costs of
accidents, the user should take cost-justified precautions taking into account the
public, not merely the private, benefit produced by the user’s technical activity.
However, under a strict liability rule, users will not take into account positive
externalities. Take the cold medicine example to illustrate. The private harm that the
user’s use causes the patentee remains $100. Thus, prior to the accident occurring,
the expected accident costs, and thus the expected liability costs, are the same as
those presented in Table 3. Thus, the user will still adopt one hour of care. However,
this is no longer optimal. Assuming the probability of the accident occurring remains
the same, if the user takes zero hours of care, the expected accident costs are now
thirty-dollars; if the user takes one hour of care, the expected accident costs are
twenty dollars; and if the user takes two hours of care, the expected accident costs
are sixteen dollars. Thus, zero hours of care yields a social loss of thirty; one hour of
care yields a total social cost of seventeen dollars; and two hours of care yields a total
social cost of ten dollars. Accordingly, taking a second hour of care would be cost
justified and minimize society’s total social cost. Nevertheless, the user will not take
this optimal level because the court has not considered the public harm caused by the
infringement.
One way to rectify this problem would be for the court to alter the liability award
to reflect the public harm rather than the merely private harm.194 But there are
significant practical obstacles to doing so. Patent infringement usually results in a
compensatory damage award, in which the remedy seeks to redress the private
harm.195 Altering this would require the court to provide a supra-compensatory
remedy. This leads to a “windfall” problem (i.e., the patentee receives more damages
through a court-imposed remedy than the patent allows her to get on the open market
through licensing).196 The patentee thus has an incentive to sue for damages rather
than license the technology. If reducing accident costs is the goal, it is counterintuitive, at best, to provide patentees with an incentive not to license the invention,
but instead to prefer for damages once an accidental infringement occurs. Unless the
patent right could be altered in some way to enable the rights holder to capture the

194. One interesting example of such damages recalibration can be found in William F.
Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL
L. REV., 385 (2016) (arguing that damages need to be reformed in various ways because of the
inability in many fields to preclear patents). As a result of this, and similar proposals on patent
damage reforms, see, e.g., John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV.
505 (2010), this Article assumes that courts are capable of adjusting damages roughly in
proportion to the positive externality. An alternative assumption and analysis was made in
Bracha & Goold, supra note 18, at 1051–56.
195. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“[T]he court shall award . . . damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement . . . in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made
of the invention by the infringer . . . .”). For criticism, see Ted Sichleman, Purging Patent Law
of ‘Private Law’ Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2014); see also Golden, supra note 194.
196. See generally Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Windfall from Punitive
Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992).
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full social value of the invention (a suggestion itself of dubious value),197 then
avoiding perverse incentives would require avoiding higher damage awards.
On the other hand, a negligence rule can be adjusted to reflect externalities, and
thus incentivize the user to take such external cost into account. If the patented
invention produces substantial positive externalities, then the court can take this into
account when assessing the harm caused by the accidental infringement. As a result,
the user would be required to take a greater level of care in order to avoid liability.
Alternatively, if the user’s own activities involve substantial positive externalities,
the court can increase the cost of the precaution in the reasonable care standard to
reflect this value; once again the user would conform to this appropriate standard.
However, a negligence standard will not encourage the patentee to take
appropriate care, taking into account positive externalities. Assuming the user
conforms to the standard of care, the patentee only bears the private costs of the
accident (her private care costs and the private expected accident costs) and not the
public costs of the accident (the private cost of preventing the accident plus the public
expected accident costs). As a result, the patentee will select a level of care that
minimizes the private cost of the patent accident but not necessarily the public cost.
Both a negligence rule with a contributory negligence defense and a comparative
negligence rule have the same unfortunate outcome.
Strict liability with a contributory negligence defense is arguably the best rule for
internalizing third-party externalities. The patentee must take reasonable care to
avoid being held contributorily negligent. The standard of reasonable care can be
adjusted to reflect public externalities caused by the patented invention (the cost of
care is increased) or on the user’s side (the cost of precaution is increased). Assuming
the patentee takes due care, the user is then held strictly liable, and the damages can
be changed to reflect either the value of the user’s or the patentee’s technical activity
for society. Unlike a simple strict liability rule, however, this does not yield a
windfall problem. In order to receive a liability award, the patentee must take
reasonable care to avoid the accident. Thus, if a patentee were to take less than
optimal care in the hope of claiming large damage awards, she would receive no
damage award at all.
D. Summary
Table 6 summarizes the discussion from Sections B and C. Analyzing the table
reveals not only that some form of negligence rule is preferable to a strict liability
rule, but also that the optimal liability rule is either a simple negligence rule, or a
strict liability rule with a contributory negligence defense. After discussing these
options, this Section concludes with some additional considerations that, in this
author’s view, tip the scales in favor of a simple negligence rule.

197. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005).
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Table 6: A Summary of Primary and Secondary Considerations
User
Care

Patent
Owner
Care

Externalities
Internalized

Administrative
Cost

Error Cost

No Liability

Not
Optimal

Optimal

No

None

None

Strict
Liability

Optimal

Not
Optimal

User
Internalizes

Moderate

Moderate

Simple
Negligence

Optimal

Optimal

User
Internalizes

Moderate

Moderate

Strict
Liability +
Contributory
Negligence

Optimal

Optimal

Owner + User
Internalizes

Moderate

High

Negligence +
Contributory
Negligence

Optimal

Optimal

User
Internalizes

High

High

Comparative
Negligence

Optimal

Optimal

User
Internalizes

High

High

Some version of a negligence liability rule is preferable to either a strict liability
or no liability rule because such a rule generates incentives for bilateral care. As this
is the primary consideration and most important value, strict liability and no liability
can easily be rejected as inappropriate liability rules. On the other hand, both
comparative negligence and negligence with a contributory negligence defense also
provide incentives for bilateral care, but each come with high error and
administrative costs; these two liability rules can therefore be easily rejected because
of the secondary considerations.
Therefore, the best option is either a simple negligence rule or a strict liability
plus contributory negligence defense liability rule. Both of these rules encourage the
technology user and the patent owner to take cost-justified precautions to avoid the
accident occurring, and thus are likely to limit social cost. Under the most important
criterion, these rules perform equally well. It is therefore down to secondary
considerations to help determine which rule is preferable. However, the secondary
considerations do not provide a clear winner. The most important secondary
consideration, activity levels, is unhelpful in this context, as the activities of both the
patent owner and the technology user affect the probability of accidental
infringement approximately equally. The remaining secondary considerations cut in
different directions: while a strict liability plus contributory negligence rule involves
higher error costs than a negligence rule, such a rule also seems better placed to
internalize third party positive externalities associated with the technical activity.
Although both rules have a legitimate claim to optimality, three additional
considerations tip the scales in favor of a simple negligence rule. First, from the
discussion in Part II, it emerged that the contemporary patent accidents problem is
caused significantly by patent owners taking less than optimal care. As the discussion
of “notice failure” highlighted, the current patent system does not provide sufficient
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incentives for the patentee to provide full ownership information to the public.198 On
the other hand, there is very little suggestion that the patent accident problem is the
result of users taking less than optimal care.199 Therefore, while an optimal liability
rule ought to ensure both parties have the right incentives, there is reason to believe
that increasing the incentives for the patent owner is comparatively the most
important goal. A simple negligence rule is preferable to strict liability plus
contributory negligence rule from this perspective. Crucially, a simple negligence
rule makes the patent owner the residual bearer of the harm, whereas strict liability
plus contributory negligence makes the user the residual bearer of the harm. As a
result, under a strict liability rule with contributory negligence defense, the patentee
will only take the precautions necessary to conform to the due care standard. Under
a negligence rule, the patentee will internalize the value of any additional costeffective precautions that are not accounted for in the negligence standard (e.g.,
activity levels or any other unforeseen variables). This is desirable in the
contemporary environment where the patentee’s lack of incentives for care are a
comparatively significant contributor to the accident problem.
Second, a negligence rule is preferable in situations where the patentee and user
select their levels of care sequentially.200 In many situations, the patentee has the
opportunity to select the level of care before the technology user. The patentee has
the opportunity to decide whether to attach markings to a product, and in what form,
and how to write the patent specification. Only later does the user decide how much
time she will invest in searching for the patentee. Under a strict liability plus
contributory negligence rule, this may lead to less than optimal incentives for the
user. If the patentee is contributorily negligent and if the user can see this ex ante,
then the user may fail to take reasonable care (knowing that any accidents which do
occur will be attributed to the patentee’s carelessness). For example, if a patentee
fails to attach notice to a product, a user, upon inspecting the product, may decide
not to spend any further time searching for the patentee, even though doing so would
help reduce accident costs, because the user accurately predicts that, if she does
infringe a patent, she will not be held liable on account of the patentee’s contributory

198. See supra text accompanying notes 87–90.
199. Some anecdotal evidence to the contrary suggests that some firms instruct their
employees not to read patents, in the hope of avoiding intentional infringement of patents,
although doing so increases the risk of accidental infringement. See, e.g., Edwin H. Taylor &
Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to Shore Up the Foundations of Patent Law that the
Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 721, 737 (1998) (“As matters now
stand many companies discourage employees from reading patents. This presumably lessens
the chance that the company will be found to have knowledge of a patent. However, this
defeats the basic purpose of the patents [sic] laws, dissemination of information.”). However,
unlike the scale of the problems presented by notice failure, which are empirically well
documented, see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, the scale of the problem of such deliberate
shielding is not empirically well grounded. Furthermore, under a negligence rule, the
incentives for such behavior may be limited. Rather than instruct employees to refrain from
reading patents, companies would be better served by employees being aware of neighboring
patents and taking reasonable precautions to avoid infringement, as this would provide a
complete defense.
200. For more information on sequential decision making to the choice of liability rule, see
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 33, at 76–77; SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 15 n.14.
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negligence. On the other hand, under a negligence rule, the user would still have the
incentive to conform to the due care standard.
The third concern is litigation costs. So far, we have assumed that the strict
liability and negligence rules lead to moderate administrative costs because, while
strict liability is easier for judges to apply than a negligence rule, the strict liability
rule leads to more infringement cases which need to be resolved. However, we have
also explored the possibility that limiting the overall volume of patent infringement
cases would minimize costs, even if the complexity of some litigation would
increase.201 Extending that line of analysis further, my intuition is that a simple
negligence rule would not only be less costly than a strict liability rule, but would
also be less costly than a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory
negligence defense. This suspicion flows from a problem of information
asymmetries. If a simple negligence rule is imposed, users can avoid litigation (or
alternative dispute resolution) by responding to infringement allegations simply by
stating what level of care they have taken. However, users do not necessarily have
the same option under a strict liability plus contributory negligence rule. In many
cases, users will not know what level of care the patentee has taken (especially if the
patentee’s level of search was negligent). Often this information will only come out
into the open at trial. As a result, without this information, many users will need to
go to trial to establish the contributory negligence defense, whereas they would not
need to do so to prove their lack of negligence. If this is true in a substantial amount
of cases, administrative costs would be lowest if a simple negligence rule were to be
adopted.
III. IMPLEMENTING NEGLIGENCE
Part III demonstrated that either a simple negligence rule or a strict liability rule
accompanied by a contributory negligence defense minimizes the social loss
associated with patent accidents. Furthermore, Part III concluded with a number of
reasons for preferring a simple negligence rule. This Part turns to issues of
implementation. Section A examines two legal regimes in more detail—the United
States and United Kingdom—and asks: How closely do these current legal regimes
approximate the ideal liability rule? It demonstrates that the U.K. regime comes
closer to the ideal regime because U.K. law denies damages in cases where the
defendant did not know nor had “reasonable grounds” for supposing that the patent
existed.202 Armed with these insights, Section B proposes a “patent negligence”
defense. In accident cases, defendants ought not be held liable when they have taken
reasonable care to avoid the accidental infringement. Section C illustrates how this
rule would apply to a range of accidental infringement cases.

201. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 220–222.
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A. Existing Legal Regimes
We shall first turn our attention to U.S. patent law (which may be described as a
“quasi-contributory negligence regime”), and thereafter to U.K. patent law (which
may be described as a “quasi-negligence regime”).
1. U.S. Patent Act
Under current U.S. law, one who accidentally infringes a patent will be held
strictly liable. Typically, the patent holder is awarded damages and an injunction.203
However, there is an exception in section 287 of the Patent Act.204 Section 287 states
that “patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United
States any patented article” may give notice to the public of the patent by attaching
the word “patent” and the patent number; if such marking is not given, then the patent
holder will not receive damages unless she has given the infringer actual notice (but
will still receive an injunction).205 The purpose of this marking requirement was
introduced to reduce the frequency of inadvertent patent infringement.206
However, the marking requirement has been interpreted narrowly by courts.207 In
particular, the requirement only applies in cases where the patentee produces
products.208 As a result, the marking “duty” does not apply in cases where the
patentee does not produce a product. Therefore, as interpreted by courts, there is no
duty to mark nor give notice in cases where the patent covers a process rather than a
product.209 Furthermore, there is no marking duty in cases of idle or noncommercialized patents (that is, patents relating to products, but where the patent
holder does not commercially market any products).210 These types of patents—both
process and idle patents—are particularly relevant in the context of patent assertion
entities (or patent “trolls”). Patent assertion entities by definition do not produce any
products, and therefore are under no marking duty; their revenue instead flows from
licensing the patented technology. In these cases, there is currently no marking duty,
and accordingly, this business model encourages patent accidents.
How does the U.S. liability regime compare to the ideal negligence rule? To
answer this, it is helpful to split the cases into two groups: those where the marking

203. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–84 (2012).
204. Id. § 287.
205. Id.
206. Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1936) (stating
that the purpose of patent marking is to provide “protection against deception by unmarked
patented articles, and requires nothing unreasonable of patentees”); Motorola, Inc. v. United
States, 729 F.2d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[A] fundamental rationale supporting section
287—supplying notice in order to prevent innocent infringement.”); Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard
Tire Co., 704, F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he purpose of this provision
is to give patentees the proper incentive to mark their products and thus place the world on
notice of the existence of the patent”).
207. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 13, at 840–45; Chiang, supra note 12, at 43–49.
208. Wine Ry. Appliance Co., 297 U.S. at 398.
209. Supra note 207.
210. Id.
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duty does not apply, and those where the marking duty does apply. In the former, the
liability regime is a straightforward strict liability rule: damages and injunctions are
awarded regardless of the level of care either party has taken to prevent the accidents
occurring. On the other hand, in cases where the marking duty applies, the liability
rule comes close to a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence
defense. That is, the user will be liable unless she can demonstrate that the patentee
was contributorily negligent in failing to provide appropriate notice.
Nevertheless, there are two ways in which the current liability regime—governing
cases in which the marking duty applies—differs from that of a standard contributory
negligence rule. First, the contributory negligence defense is implemented using
rules rather than standards. Legal theory demonstrates how the same legal directive
can be implemented in a variety of more or less precise ways.211 For example, in
order to encourage drivers to drive at a reasonable speed, a legal rule could be drafted
using a vague and flexible standard (i.e., drivers must drive “reasonably”), or
alternatively, a more precise and more rigid rule could be adopted (i.e., drivers must
drive under 30mph). The benefits and costs of each regime are discussed in detail in
a voluminous amount of literature.212 Typically, when legal scholars discuss
contributory negligence, they make reference to a contributory negligence rule
drafted using standards (i.e., the defendant will be liable unless the plaintiff failed to
take “reasonable care”). However, in section 287, the contributory negligence
standard is not drafted using a vague and flexible standard, but instead using a bright
line rule: the patentee will be contributorily negligent if she failed to appropriately
mark the product or provide the user with actual notice.213
Second, and more significantly, even if the plaintiff is contributorily negligent,
she may still be awarded an injunction. This is unusual for a negligence rule. As
Calabresi and Melamed demonstrated, “property rules” (i.e., entitlements protected
by injunctive relief) are appropriate in cases where the parties can bargain ex ante.214
This allows the market to allocate goods to the actors that value them the most.
However, where transaction costs prevent ex ante bargaining, then a liability rule
ought to be imposed (i.e., injunctive relief ought to be denied and damages
imposed).215 The question thereafter becomes what type of liability rule ought to be
imposed: strict liability or some form of negligence liability rule? As highlighted by
others previously, patent accidents involve cases where ex ante bargaining cannot
take place, and, therefore, a property rule is unhelpful, and a liability rule ought to be
imposed.216 This Article is concerned with the next step of the analysis and suggests
a negligence rule is preferable to a strict liability rule. However, the current section
287 rule is a hybrid in that it denies damages when the patentee was contributorily
negligent but nevertheless allows the patentee to receive an injunction.

211. See generally, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
212. See supra note 211.
213. See supra note 211.
214. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089–90 (1972).
215. Id. at 1105–10.
216. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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Presumably, this difference can be explained on the grounds that after a court has
found infringement, the transaction costs between the user and the patentee are
reduced: the user now knows whom to contact to license the technology.217
Therefore, while the court should impose a negligence liability rule for past conduct,
future conduct ought to be treated as nonaccidental and thus governed by a property
rule to encourage effective market transactions.
Yet, this reasoning leaves much to be desired. In many instances, injunctive relief
will lead to a “hold-up” problem.218 Frequently by this point, the technology user will
have built a business around the use of the technology and, therefore, not be in a
position to easily carry on business without it. There is a substantial chance that
technology users who become accidental infringers will become “locked in” and be
unable to change their business to avoid the patent infringement. In such
circumstances, injunctive relief allows the patentee to shut the user’s business down,
unless the user pays a very high licensing fee (i.e., above the rate that the user would
have paid if they had truly bargained ex ante). To illustrate, in the RIM v. NTP case,
NTP’s injunctive relief enabled them to extract a $613 million license fee from
RIM.219 The potential for receiving a highly lucrative injunction in turn distorts the
incentives for patentee care: by taking less than optimal care, they may lose the
possibility of obtaining damages but may increase their ability to receive an
injunction, which may be even more profitable. Thus, the presence of ex post
injunctions threatens the very goal the law should achieve (i.e., that both parties take
an appropriate level of care to prevent accidents ex ante).
2. U.K. Patent Act
Like in the United States, liability for accidental infringement in the United
Kingdom is imposed strictly. But also like in the United States, damages will be
refused in some cases. Section 62 of the Patent Act of 1977 states that no damages
will be awarded against a defendant who was not aware of the infringement “and had
no reasonable grounds for supposing” that the patent existed.220 If a patented product
contains the word “patent” and the relevant patent number, then the user shall be
deemed to have reasonable grounds for supposing the patent existed.221 Courts have

217. This reasoning was implicit in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, where the court
focused not on the initial potentially accidental infringement, but instead on what actions
Schmeiser ought to have taken after having found the patented seeds on his farmland. [2004]
1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
218. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007).
219. RIM’s Sensible Patent Payout Keeps BlackBerry Users Hooked, WALL STREET J.
(Mar. 6, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114160357490989930
[https://perma.cc/T9BL-4G3M].
220. Patent Act 1977, c. 37, § 62.
221. Id.
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held that the “reasonable grounds” test is objective, and, in many cases, compared it
to the “reasonable person” negligence standard.222
Recent cases illustrate the rule’s scope. In Collingwood Lightning Ltd v.
Aurora,223 the patentee produced a fire-resistant LED downlight. The defendants
alleged they had no grounds to know of the patent, but the court disagreed: the
patented product had been featured in a trade magazine (as the magazine’s
“Innovative Product of the Year”) with wide circulation, and which was frequently
read by the defendant’s technical staff.224
In contrast, the defense was successfully argued in Micromatic A/S.225 In that case,
the claimant produced a patented valve coupling to stop valves in pressurized
containers (e.g., beer kegs) from “shooting out” when removed.226 Crucial to the
functioning of the invention was a “lower pin.”227 However, the patent did not
explain the function of this lower pin.228 After the function of the lower pin was
established at trial, the court held that the patent was invalid for lack of novelty and
inventive step.229 But the court went one step further and stated that had it found the
patent valid, it nevertheless would not have awarded damages because, in not
explaining the functioning of the lower pin, the patent was not drafted with
“reasonable skill and knowledge.” Thus, the defendants had no reasonable grounds
for supposing they infringed the patent.230
Finally, in Schenck Rotec v. Universal Balancing, the plaintiff produced a device
and a method for fixing balancing weights to a rotor.231 The defendants were a
competitor in the market.232 The claimant alleged infringement in 2010, and the
defendants claimed section 62 applied.233 Schenck argued that the defendants ought
to have performed a search of the patent register; they argued that there were only
four significant players in the propshaft balancing industry and that all other
incumbents patented their inventions. However, the judge disagreed.234 The judge
found that the “possibility for new developments in this field is limited,”235 and that
the defendants had not seen the patentee’s brochures or literature describing their
product as “patented.”236 As a result, the court found that the facts known to the
defendants “at the time were not such that would lead to a reasonable person to think
the patent existed,” nor “would these facts lead a reasonable person to think they

222. See, e.g., Schenck Rotec GmbH v. Universal Balancing Ltd. [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat)
(“The facts known to Universal Balancing at the time were not such that would lead a
reasonable person to think the patent existed.”).
223. [2014] EWHC 228 (Pat).
224. Id.
225. Micromatic A/S v. Dispense Sys. Int’l BV [2001] 5 WLUK 209 (Ch D (Patents Ct)).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at ¶ 223.
236. Id.
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should conduct patent searches” to see if their product infringed a competitor’s
patents.237
The U.K. provision is best described as a “quasi-negligence” rule where the
burden of proof is on the defendant to prove their lack of negligence. Unlike the U.S.
courts, U.K. courts examine the user’s level of care rather than the patentee’s. In
cases where the patentee markets products, there is an additional evidentiary rule: if
the patentee attached appropriate notice, the court may infer the defendant behaved
negligently. But, unlike the U.S. provision, the negligence rule is not limited to these
cases, and, accordingly, the rule is broader in scope than section 287 of the U.S.
Patent Act. The negligence rule applies to all forms of accidental patent infringement
and not merely infringement of patented products. However, like the U.S. law,
injunctions are still routinely awarded to restrain future activity.
In sum, both the U.K. and U.S. law already adopt some mechanisms to encourage
bilateral care, and, in this sense, approximate some form of negligence rule.
However, both legal regimes implement that negligence rule imperfectly. Armed
with this insight, we can turn to reform proposals.
B. A Patent Negligence Defense
This Article recommends that countries dealing with the problem of patent
accidents adopt some version of a “patent negligence” defense.238 Implementing such
a rule would require courts to first determine whether the infringement was
accidental or not. This would require the judge to consider the ex ante position of the
defendant. If a reasonable person would have foreseen that the planned conduct
would almost certainly infringe a patent, the infringement should be classified as
intentional and subject to the normal procedures (including supra-compensatory
damages for willful infringement). In these cases, nothing need change. On the other
hand, if the court determines that a reasonable person would only have foreseen a
substantial risk that the planned conduct may amount to a patent infringement, then
courts ought to apply a negligence rule. Courts in these cases should be directed to
assess whether the technology user adopted all reasonable care to mitigate the risk,
using the Learned Hand Formula as a guide to determine whether a given
precautionary measure was reasonable or not. If a defendant is deemed to have failed
to take all reasonable care available, then the defendant ought to be held liable for
damages. If, however, the defendant did take all reasonable care, then the defendant
ought to be held not liable and subject to neither damages nor injunction.
This proposal recommends implementing a negligence rule via legal standards
rather than a more precise set of rules. Courts ought to have broad discretion to
consider whether the defendant adopted all “reasonable” precautionary measures in
the circumstances. The alternative would be to define a set of precise rules which
approximate the negligence determination (e.g., the defendant must be found
negligent if she failed to search the patent registry). The pros and cons of such rules

237. Id. at ¶ 224.
238. Cf. Ard, supra note 16 at 733–35 (proposing a compulsory license after reasonable
search efforts).
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are well established in the literature.239 While proxy rules provide more legal
certainty, their inflexibility frequently leads to over- and under-inclusiveness. 240 For
example, courts could adopt a rule that any user who fails to perform a search of the
patent register will be considered negligent. However, such a rule is overinclusive: it
holds liable those who fail to search when it would not be reasonable to do so (such
as the defendant in Schenck).241 The rule would also be under-inclusive: some users
would be held not liable for infringement on the grounds that they searched the
register, even though they failed to take some alternative care measure which may
have been cost justified in the circumstances (e.g., inspecting products for patent
information).
A good example of the potential for over and underinclusiveness in this area
comes from contemporary U.S. law. Section 287 was drafted to encourage patentee
care and prevent accidental infringement.242 But it is underinclusive in that the rule
does not encourage patentee care from those who hold patents on processes or
noncommercialized products, and it is overinclusive in exempting from liability
defendants who have not infringed accidentally (i.e., those who knowingly infringe
but are shielded from damages because the patentee has failed to provide appropriate
notice). While this over and underinclusivity could theoretically be resolved by
creating an even more fine grained set of rules, I am unconvinced this would be an
efficient approach to legal design. As demonstrated in Part II, the situations in which
accidental patent infringement occurs are highly heterogenous, and, accordingly
accidental infringement, like accidents in other parts of tort law, is a problem best
solved by increasing judicial discretion to apply a flexible standard.243
Nevertheless, rules will still play a part in the patent negligence defense. Over
time, courts will undoubtedly formulate evidentiary rules that indicate when a user
has behaved negligently.244 This will increase certainty incrementally to an
appropriate level. A starting point should be the example in contemporary U.K. law.
In cases of patented products, courts should adopt an evidentiary rule that, if the
patentee has attached the word “patent” and a patent number, then the defendant is
presumably negligent. This, however, ought to take the form of a rebuttable
presumption. If the defendant can prove that, despite the existence of the patent
information marking, they took all reasonable care, then they nevertheless ought not
to be held liable.
The proposed defense is an affirmative defense. The burden of proof falls on the
user to establish the defense once a prima facie case of infringement has been
established. While clearly a change to patent doctrine, this would provide the
simplest and least intrusive intervention into the existing system. Under this
proposal, most patent cases would remain unaltered: in nonaccident cases, patent
cases would proceed as they currently do. Indeed, in many accident cases, there

239. See supra note 211.
240. See supra note 211.
241. Schenck [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat).
242. See supra note 206.
243. See Ehrilich & Posner, supra note 211, at 270 (“The problems of overinclusion and
underinclusion are more serious the greater the heterogeneity (or ambiguity, or uncertainty) of
the conduct intended to be affected.”).
244. See Kaplow, supra note 211, at 577–79.
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would be very little change: many defendants who do not have the required evidence
to prove reasonable care are more likely to reach a settlement, rather than attempt
defense. The only cases that would change are those in where the defendant has a
plausible argument that they adopted all reasonable care.
As will be recalled from Section II.C, a number of authors raised concerns about
the feasibility of adopting a negligence rule. At this point, we can see how adopting
a patent negligence affirmative defense would avoid or mitigate those concerns. Blair
and Cotter argue that the administrative costs of a negligence rule are too high.245
The first, and most important, response to this concern is that the administrative costs
of strict liability are already very high: strict liability leads to large numbers of
infringement claims which would not reach court under a negligence liability rule.246
Given the Bessen and Meurer findings on the explosion of patent litigation in recent
years due to the number of infringement claims, the claim that strict liability is
administratively less costly than a negligence rule invites questions.247 Furthermore,
not only will those administrative costs be mitigated by the doctrine of stare decisis,
but these “extra” costs will only apply in a subset of patent infringement cases,
namely accident cases.
Similarly, Robert Merges defends strict liability on two grounds.248 First, Merges
argues that proving “copying” would be costly for patent holders.249 But, while there
is certainly truth in Merges’s concern, this Article does not make such a proposal.
Instead, this Article proposes that the defendant avoid liability by proving they took
reasonable care to prevent infringement. Accordingly, the legal costs for the patent
holder will not be significantly altered. Secondly, Merges argues that if knowledge
of the patent is a precondition for patent infringement, then technology users will
have an incentive to shield their research staff from technology subject to a patent in
order to prevent those researchers from copying patented material.250 However, in
the vast majority of cases, shielding researchers will not qualify as a “reasonable”
precautionary measure. Indeed, as Merges highlights, the costs of shielding in terms
of lost knowledge transfer will be great, and the benefits in terms of reduced accident
prevention will often be slight.251 Accordingly, a defendant who fails to adopt such
shielding tactics would not be deemed negligent. As a result, innovative companies
would not have an incentive to take such inefficient measures.
By far the best way for such a rule to be implemented would be through
legislation. Ideally, the legislature ought to enact a provision stating that, in cases of
accidental infringement, the defendant will be subject to compensatory damages and
an injunction if she has failed to take all reasonable care. The legislation should then
further define an infringement as accidental if, prior to performing the technical
activity, the defendant could not establish with reasonable certainty whether the
technical activity would be infringing behavior or not. The legislation should also
establish the Hand Formula as the test for whether a precautionary measure is

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Blair & Cotter, supra note 13, at 821–29.
See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 110–17.
See supra text accompanying notes 110–17.
See supra text accompanying notes 110–17.
See supra text accompanying notes 110–17.
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reasonable or not. In the United States, an ideal place for this defense would be
section 271 of the Patent Act, which currently defines infringement (proposed
subsection i.).252 Likewise, in the United Kingdom, section 62 (on the “Meaning of
Infringement”) would serve as an appropriate destination.253
Alternatively, courts could also take the lead implementing a negligence rule. In
the United Kingdom, this would require only a modest change in practice. The law
already directs the court to deny damages in cases where the defendant behaved
reasonably.254 The only additional step required would be for courts to deny
injunctions in the same cases. Currently, while routinely awarded, injunctions will
be denied in certain cases, such as where the injunction would be oppressive on the
defendant.255 In cases where the defendant could not be certain of the infringement
ex ante and has taken the care of a reasonable person in ascertaining the status of the
technology, it would be oppressive to award an injunction and thereby threaten to
shut down a socially desirable business. Moreover, article 3(2) of the EU
Enforcement Directive requires that remedial measures be imposed on the basis of
their proportionality, amongst other things.256 Denying the injunction in such cases
would arguably be proportional to the user’s level of culpability.
In the United States, courts would need to adopt a more interventionist approach.
Unlike the United Kingdom, in many cases, the liability standard in the United States
is strict, and only in some cases is a contributory negligence defense partially
adopted.257 Yet, the Patent Act does not at any point state that the liability for patents
must be strict.258 The question of fault in patent law has long been a judicial decision.
Lynda J. Oswald demonstrates in her history of patent infringement that U.S. courts
adopted strict liability for patent infringement in the nineteenth century.259 Courts
and early treatise writers argued that patents were a form of property and imported
concepts into patent from property law, including the strict liability infringement
rule.260 This rule was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hogg v. Emerson in 1850
and has remained part of patent law ever since.261 When Congress revised statutory
patent law, there was little questioning of whether accidental infringement ought to
be strict or fault based.262 Courts today retain the authority to modify this judicially
created rule. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have the authority
to hold that a defendant only be held liable for negligent accidental infringements of
patent rights. Therefore, in the absence of congressional action, courts could find
that, in accidental infringement cases, a defendant who proves that she has taken all

252. 35 U.S.C. §271 (2012 & Supp. 2019).
253. Patent Act 1977, c. 37, § 62.
254. Id.
255. See Navitaire Inc. v. EasyJet Airline Co. Ltd. (No. 2) [2005] EWHC 0282 (Ch);
[2006] RPC 4 (Eng.); Sterwin A.G. v. Brocades Ltd. [1979] RPC 22 (Gr. Brit.).
256. Council Directive 2004/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16.
257. See supra notes 208–11 and accompanying text.
258. Indeed, as Oswald points out, no U.S. patent legislation in the past two centuries uses
such language. See Oswald, supra note 29, at 995.
259. Oswald, supra note 29 at 995–99.
260. Id.
261. 52 U.S. 587, 607–08 (1850).
262. Oswald, supra note 29, at 1013–21.
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reasonable care is not within the definition of an infringer and thus not liable. Section
287 would thereafter layer over this basic liability rule. The underlying liability rule
would be negligence, and section 287 would provide an evidentiary rule that, in cases
of products, a defendant is taken to be liable if the patentee attached appropriate
marking to the product.
C. Illustrative Applications
Having proposed the introduction of a “patent negligence” defense, this Section
considers how such a defense would apply in certain high-profile accident cases. In
particular, the cases of NTP v. RIM, Rambus v. Infineon, and Monsanto v. Schmeiser
will be examined. These cases are selected because together they illustrate how the
negligence rule would apply to a number of areas of contemporary concern in patent
law: patent thickets, patent trolls, strategic behavior, and self-replicating
technologies. The analysis shows how these are not isolated problems facing the
patent system, but instead are the emanations of a deeper, more significant accident
crisis that remains unaddressed.
1. NTP v. RIM: Patent Thickets and Patent Trolls
As previously highlighted, the NTP case is illustrative of the problems caused by
patent thickets, particularly in the smartphone sector, and is further interesting
because the plaintiff was a non-practicing entity.263 How would such a case be
analyzed under this Article’s proposed negligence rule? To answer that question, we
must ask: Did RIM take all reasonable measures to avoid the infringement? In other
words, did RIM behave negligently? Or were there any precautionary measures that
NTP could have adopted that would have helped avoid this particular accident? The
following Section tentatively sketches the argument that RIM did not behave
negligently. However, this conclusion is tentative. As will be seen, whether RIM
behaved without due care is a difficult question, with finely balanced arguments on
either side.
What precautionary measures were available to RIM to prevent the Blackberry’s
infringement of NTP’s patents? One obvious precautionary measure would be to
complete a search of the patent register. Under normal circumstances, searching the
patent register is a reasonable precautionary measure and one we would expect
technology users to perform. In most cases, the benefit of searching the register will
far outweigh the cost doing so imposes: the reduction in expected accident costs will
often be great compared to a relatively modest cost. From my investigation into the
case, I cannot find evidence that RIM did in fact perform a patent search. Assuming
that they did not, then we normally would conclude that RIM failed to take all
reasonable precautions for preventing the accident.

263. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751 (D. Va. 2003). For
examples of other solutions designed to mitigate perceived consequences of non-practicing
entities, see, e.g., Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and
Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437 (2013).
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However, the RIM case is not an ordinary one. In that case, it is conceivable that
performing a patent search would have been largely ineffective due to the existence
of a patent thicket. As highlighted earlier, the smartphone sector is one that suffers
heavily from the existence of multiple overlapping patents.264 Accordingly, the
ability for RIM to find all of the relevant patents through searching the register would
have been very low indeed. If RIM attempted to find all the relevant patents, it would
require a very significant amount of investment of time and labor into the searching
process. Before RIM produced the Blackberry, therefore, their option was to perform
a costly patent search that was likely to yield little marginal benefit in terms of
reduction in expected accident costs (as demonstrated by the fact that when the
USPTO searched the register during RIM’s later patent application, it too did not
uncover NTP’s patent). This may explain why RIM seemingly did not perform the
search. As we have seen, under a strict liability rule, the user has an incentive to take
cost-justified precautionary measures. This precautionary measure was arguably not
cost justified, and thus it is little surprise it was not taken.265 Accordingly, Bessen
and Meurer conclude that it was likely inefficient for RIM to perform such a
search.266
Was searching the register the only possible precautionary measure? Perhaps not.
In January 2000, NTP sent RIM a letter explaining their belief that RIM was
infringing their technology.267 This arrived sixteen months before NTP initiated a
patent infringement suit in Virginia.268 How ought a reasonable company respond to
such a letter? Upon receiving an infringement notice, it is arguable that a reasonable
precautionary measure would be to hire patent attorneys to analyze the claims made
by the patent holder and determine whether there was indeed any infringement. It is
not clear, however, whether RIM adopted such measures. At trial, some evidence
was introduced to suggest that RIM had carefully considered the claims, while other
evidence was presented that RIM ignored the letter.269 Assuming the letter was
ignored, was that evidence that RIM failed to take all reasonable precautions?
Perhaps. Although the argument could also be made that such letter arrived after
RIM had commenced the patent infringement. By this point, the Blackberry device
was being sold commercially. It is conceivable that analyzing the claims made in the

264. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
265. An interesting comparison can be made between the RIM case and the British Schenck
case discussed earlier. See Schenck Rotec v. Universal Balancing [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat).
In Schenck, it was concluded that there was no evidence that would lead a reasonable person
to think they should conclude a patent search, and thus search was not considered a reasonable
measure to take. It is plausible that RIMs actions were similarly reasonable. Id.
266. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 50 (“The costs of sorting through a large number
of uncertain property rights is larger than the expected cost incurred when any one patent is
asserted against the innovator. We cannot be sure, but we would not be surprised if RIM’s
failure to do a patent search was, at the time, the best business decision available to the
company.”).
267. NTP, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 755–58 (discussing the sufficiency of RIM’s investigation and the conflicting
testimony presented).
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letter would have imposed a cost on RIM, which, due to the timing of the letter,
would not have helped prevent the infringement in the first instance.
On the other hand, what, if anything could NTP have done to prevent the
infringement? Most importantly, NTP could have informed RIM of their patents
before RIM started selling the Blackberry. To demonstrate this point, we need some
context surrounding the introduction of the Blackberry. From 1995 to 1999, there
were only a handful of producers selling pagers incorporating wireless technology:
Motorola, US Robotics, Nokia, and RIM.270 After becoming a publicly traded
company on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1997,271 RIM entered this market with
the production of the Inter@ctive 900 two-way pager, which allowed users to send
and receive messages over the internet via a wireless data network known as
Mobitex.272 This product was commercially successful and in 1997 was named the
Top Product by “Wireless for the Corporate User” magazine.273 This was just one in
a string of high publicity awards. Between 1997 and 1999, RIM won awards for
Excellence in Innovation from the Network Computing Magazine, was voted High
Technology Entrepreneur of the Year by the Canadian Advanced Technology
Association, received the Editor’s Choice Award by CNET, and received the
Mobility Award for Mobile Insights from the Smithsonian, to name just a few.274
During the same time, RIM had signed wireless handheld supply contracts with
American Mobile, IBM, and Rogers Cantel (now AT&T).275 The two-way pager was
so successful that by 1998 RIM was concerned about copycats producing similar
pagers, and accordingly applied for a patent on their wireless technology.276 By 1999,
the Blackberry was introduced and was already a heavily publicized and established
product. Business Week called it the close to perfect pocket e-mail, while celebrities
such as Bill Gates and Pamela Anderson were already adopting it and promoting it.277
In these circumstances, it would have been reasonable for NTP to inform RIM of
their patents at an earlier date. NTP was a patent assertion entity, with a very limited
number of patents related to wireless technology. A reasonable patent holder in these
circumstances should consider who in the industry may potentially be using their
patented technology, and take simple measures to ensure that those potential users
do not become accidental infringers—especially when, in areas affected by patent
thickets, it is unreasonable to expect the patent register alone to fulfill this task. In
this case, NTP only had to keep track of a handful of companies who were potentially
infringing their patents—those few companies endeavoring to produce wireless

270. MCNISH & SILCOFF, supra note 1, at 44. As a result, this situation squarely falls within
the fact pattern that Chiang identified wherein it is easier for patentees to search for producers
than vice versa. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text.
271. RESEARCH IN MOTION, supra note 40.
272. RESEARCH IN MOTION, supra note 40.
273. Press Release, RIM, Research in Motion Increases Contract with RAM Mobile Data
to $90 Million (Jan. 7, 1998) (on file with author).
274. RESEARCH IN MOTION, supra note 40.
275. RESEARCH IN MOTION, supra note 40.
276. Andrew Zipern, Hardware: Pager Maker Wins Key Patent, NY TIMES (May 18,
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/18/business/technology-briefing-hardware-pager
-maker-wins-key-patent.html [https://perma.cc/S57G-VJHW].
277. MCNISH & SILCOFF, supra note 1, at 75.
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email pagers. These companies, and RIM in particular, were not hidden from public
view. Rather, as the proceeding discussion shows, their wireless pagers were very
well publicized and discussed in magazines dedicated to wireless technology. In
these circumstances, if NTP adopted a little more care in monitoring the market and
keeping wireless technology producers aware of their patent rights, then we would
expect to see a reduction in the chances of a patent accident occurring. If RIM were
exculpated from liability, NTP and those similarly situated in the future would have
a clear incentive to take these precautionary measures.
The conclusion that RIM was not negligent is, however, tentative. Clearly more
knowledge of the case facts would be necessary to come to a final conclusion. Under
the current strict liability rule, the court is not obligated to assess the level of care
taken by the parties. As a result, the court record in the RIM case does not clearly
demonstrate the level of care RIM adopted nor the variables necessary to determining
whether such care was reasonable. Therefore, it is possible that the defendant’s level
of care was unreasonable. This is particularly true in relation to RIM’s failure to
search the patent register. If so, then the defendant did indeed behave negligently and
ought to be subject to a damages award (but not injunction).
Crucially, however, even if RIM was found liable under a negligence rule, this
would still help create incentives for bilateral care. In the future, parties in RIM’s
situation could avoid damages by performing a reasonable patent search. Meanwhile,
parties in NTP’s situation would also take precautionary measures—perceiving the
likelihood that most users will perform a patent search and thus be found nonnegligent, the patentee will increase their chances of revenue by making their
ownership information more readily apparent to users.
2. Rambus v. Infineon: Strategic Behavior
As discussed earlier, patentees can often “benefit from strategically hiding,
obfuscating, and distorting” information contained in the patent.278 We discussed the
Rambus case as an example. In this case, Rambus waited until Infineon was “locked
in” to using a standards-essential patent before seeking and enforcing new patent
claims.279 Only when Infineon adopted the SDRAM technological standard did
Rambus disclose their new patent claims and bring an infringement action.280
Did Infineon behave negligently? The answer is almost certainly no! Infineon was
an active participant in the JEDEC Standard Setting Organization (SSO) and
responsibly inspected all patents that, according to the SSO’s rules, were related to
the relevant standards. That included inspecting the relevant dynamic random-access
memory (DRAM) patent before making any manufacturing decisions. Having
responsibly inspected the available patent information, Infineon began
manufacturing. Only then did Rambus seek further claims, which, when later issued,
would potentially enjoin Infineon’s business. Of course, Infineon could have decided
not to manufacture anything on the grounds that Rambus—a known patent assertion
entity—may potentially seek continuations that would later enjoin their production.

278. Menell & Meurer, supra note 87, at 5.
279. See Chiang, supra note 12, at 11–13.
280. Id.
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But such care would clearly have been excessive, resulting in a massive opportunity
cost for both Infineon and its customers. We can be confident that Infineon, therefore,
met its duty of care.
Under a negligence rule, the incentives for this type of strategic behavior would
diminish. Having adopted all reasonable measures of care, Infineon would not be
liable to Rambus. Not only would Infineon avoid damages, but they would also not
be subject to an injunction. The consequence is that such strategic claiming would
be completely unprofitable for Rambus. The financial incentive to secretly seek new
claims, and to opportunistically trap the unwary, would be completely undercut.
3. Monsanto v. Schmeiser: Self-Replicating Technologies
The Schmeiser case discussed above has generated much academic commentary.
In particular, writers have questioned whether the defendant ought to have been
subject to a strict liability rule if, as he claimed, the patented seeds accidentally made
their way onto his land through cross-fertilization. British treatise writers, Bently,
Sherman, Gangjee, and Johnson argue that farmers, “through no fault of their own,
may be liable for patent infringement when a patented plant ‘invades’ their
property”281 and highlight that similar problems could occur in relation to other selfreplicating technologies, such as genetically modified animals. Similarly,
Christopher Holman argues that “while strict liability might be acceptable for most
technologies, the ease with which seeds can spread and reproduce relatively
autonomously raises serious public policy concerns.”282 But when viewed through
the lens of accident law, one sees this is not an isolated incident affecting only
biotechnology and self-replicating technologies. This is merely one instance of the
broader phenomenon of accidental infringement. And once again, a negligence
liability rule would be the appropriate response to such a case.
Assuming for now the case was truly one of accidental infringement, both Percy
Schmeiser and Monsanto could have taken steps to prevent the infringement from
occurring. Farmers in Percy Schmeiser’s position can limit the chances of becoming
accidental patent infringers by “fencing out” the invading seeds; this involves
creating buffer zones, erecting hedges and other barriers, and “temporal spacing”
(i.e., planting crops at different times of year from neighboring farms to limit the
chance of cross-fertilization), or cleaning rented equipment thoroughly before use.283
All of these measures are costly but do effectively reduce the possibility of an
accident occurring.
The patentee can equally take care to avoid the infringement. One famous
example in the seed context is through employing “Gene Use Restriction

281. LIONEL BENTLY, BRAD SHERMAN, DEV GANGJEE & PHILLIP JOHNSON, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 640 (5th ed. 2018).
282. Christopher M. Holman, Bowman v. Monsanto Co.: A Bellwether for the Emerging
Issue of Patentable Self-Replicating Technologies and Inadvertent Infringement, 80 MO. L.
REV. 665, 680 (2015); see also Siddharth Khanijou, Patent Inequity? Rethinking the
Application of Strict Liability to Patent Law in the Nanotechnology Era, 12 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 179 (2007).
283. See generally JIM RIDDLE, UNIV. MINN: SW. RESEARCH & OUTREACH CTR., GMO
CONTAMINATION PREVENTION: WHAT DOES IT TAKE? (2013).
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Technologies” (GURTs).284 Genetically modified seeds can be further modified such
that the plant’s offspring do not contain particular traits conferred by the transgenic
seed. As a result, if the seed accidentally blows onto another’s land, the resulting
progeny are not patent-infringing.285 But the precautionary measures at the patent
holder’s disposal are not limited to complex technological measures. Like George
Selden and the Model T, simply publicizing the nature of the risk to farmers would
help.286 Farmers such as Schmeiser can only adopt effective precautionary measures
if they are aware of the risk, and the patent holder can make this danger clearer
through publicity. Likewise, the patent holder can also “fence in” the travelling seeds
by erecting appropriate windbreaks or barriers. The patent holder could contribute
financially to such initiatives or contractually require that users of their patented
seeds do so as a condition of use. As a result, moral philosopher Zoë Robaey argues
that the duty to prevent such contamination is not to be borne entirely by the farmer,
nor entirely by the patent holder, but that there is a “collective, or joint, imperative
to act responsibly to limit or avoid contamination” through such cross-pollination.287
How would adopting a negligence rule affect incentives in the Schmeiser case?
Once again, the main difference would be that such a rule would create incentives
for appropriate care on the patentee side. Under a strict liability rule, Schmeiser
already faced incentives to adopt reasonable preventative measures. This would
remain the case under a negligence rule. This is not only appropriate but provides a
better solution than simply exculpating all “passive infringers.” We should expect
farmers in Schmeiser’s position to adopt reasonable measures. Failure to do so
should result in the farmer bearing partial responsibility for the accidental
infringement. But equally, farmers who do take reasonable measures to avoid the
infringement ought to be exculpated, thus shifting part of the responsibility back onto
the patent owner.
CONCLUSION
Accidental patent infringement is a significant and growing problem. As the
number of broad and amorphous patents grows, the probability that one will
inadvertently infringe a patent increases. This Article has argued that, rather than
deem all accidental infringers strictly liable, we ought to hold such defendants legally
responsible only when they have failed to take reasonable care to avoid the
infringement. Applying theoretical economic models found routinely in tort
literature, the Article has analyzed the costs and benefits of the various liability rules
that could apply to patent accidents. While current doctrine holds patentees strictly
liable, this Article has found that either a strict liability rule with a contributory

284. See, e.g., Yi Sang, Reginald J. Millwood & C. Neal Stewart Jr., Gene Use Restriction
Technologies for Transgenic Plant Bioconfinement, 11 PLANT BIOTECH. J. 649 (2013).
285. Id.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43.
287. Zoë Robaey, Seeding Moral Responsibility in Ownership: How to Deal with
Uncertain Risks of GMOs (2017) (unpublished Masters dissertation, Universiteit Maastricht),
https://ethicsandtechnology.eu/wp-content/uploads/downloadable-content/Robaey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UA2F-QDPN]; see also Zoë Robaey, Gone with the Wind: Conceiving of
Moral Responsibility in the Case of GMO Contamination, 22 SCI. ENG. ETHICS 889 (2016).
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negligence defense or a simple negligence rule would improve social welfare.
Accordingly, the Article recommends the introduction of a “patent negligence”
defense. Defendants should be liable for accidental infringement of patents but only
when they have failed to take the care of a reasonable person. As Guido Calabresi,
in relation to physical injury accidents, pointed out fifty years ago: “Our society is
not committed to preserving life at any cost.”288 We should not be committed to
preserving patents at any cost either!

288. CALABRESI, supra note 25, at 17.

